Dynamics in European identity formation by Kolind, Frederik
?????????
????????????
??????????????????
?????????????????????????
????????? ?????
 
 
 
 
Standardforside til projekter og specialer 
 
Til obligatorisk brug på alle projekter og specialer på: 
  
• Internationale udviklingsstudier 
• Global Studies 
• Erasmus Mundus, Global Studies – A European Perspective 
• Offentlig Administration 
• Socialvidenskab 
• EU-studies 
• Scient. Adm.(Lang Forvaltning) 
 
Udfyldningsvejledning på næste side. 
 
Projekt- eller specialetitel:  
Dynamics in European identity formation 
Projektseminar/værkstedsseminar: 
 
Udarbejdet af (Navn(e) og studienr.): Projektets art: Modul: 
Frederik Kolind, 40356 Speciale Forvaltning, K4 
   
   
   
   
   
Vejleders navn:  
Sevasti Chatzopoulou 
Afleveringsdato:  
28. april 2014 
Antal anslag incl. mellemrum: (Se næste side) 
152.309 
Tilladte antal anslag incl. mellemrum jvt. de udfyldende bestemmelser: (Se næste side) 
144.000 – 192.000 
 
OBS! 
Hvis du overskrider de tilladte antal anslag incl. mellemrum vil dit projekt blive afvist indtil 1 
uge efter aflevering af censor og/eller vejleder 
 
 
!!
Abstract 
To scholars of European identity formation it has become well established that Europeans have 
multiple identities. A majority of Europeans identify not only with the nation-state, but also with 
Europe - at least to some extent. This finding is important as it suggests that a European collective 
identity can exist alongside well-rooted national identities and that the two do not exist in a zero-
sum relationship. While this provides important insight we still need a better understanding of how 
and when a European collective identity might emerge. The following thesis investigates the 
dynamics of European identity formation with the purpose of contributing to our understanding of 
the circumstances affecting the potential for collective identity formation within the EU.   
Theoretically the thesis draws upon self-categorization theory according to which collective 
identities take form on the basis of a very basic human need for a social identity. As such collective 
identities emerge when individuals social identities are activated. In these situations a group of 
individuals, in agreement with each other, categorize themselves as members of the same group. 
Following this, I approach the question of European identity formation by studying when and how 
Europeans are expected to categorize themselves as Europeans. Self-categorization theory 
introduces the concepts of situational relevance and commitment to describe the circumstances 
under which collective identities take form.  Situational relevance refers to how well a particular 
social identity fits a particular situation, while commitment relates to how strong a sense of 
belonging an individual feels towards the group. Following the so-called meta-contrast principle a 
social identity is fitting when the internal differences between members of the group are perceived 
as smaller than the differences between group members and non-group members. Commitment 
towards the groups is increased either through interaction and cooperation among group members 
or through the construction of group-symbols.  
Following the distinction between situational relevance and commitment I structure my analysis in 
two sections. Based on the meta-contrast principle the first section investigates how the EU’s 
perceived role in the global community as well as the introduction of EU-citizenship might increase 
the situational relevance of a European identity. Given how commitment is increased through 
cooperation and interaction the second section focuses mainly on the degree to which officials in 
EU-institutions and well as citizens engaged in various cross-border practices are likely to activate a 
social European identity.  
Based on the analysis the thesis finds three circumstances that are likely to affect the potential for a 
European collective identity. First, collective European identity is more likely to emerge to the 
extent the EU is perceived as a distinct entity in the global community. Second, a collective identity 
is more likely to emerge when Europeans engage in interaction with intrinsic value rather than 
instrumental cooperation and bargaining. Third, interaction among Europeans only stimulates 
European collective identity formation to the extent it is internally inclusive and externally 
exclusive. 
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1. Introduction  
This thesis deals with dynamics of collective identity formation in the EU. By studying the question 
of European identity I am in no way entering unchartered territory. During the last two decades the 
field of integration scholarship has witnessed a surge of books, journals and conferences all devoted 
to this particular topic. The questions of how, when and if a European identity takes form has been 
studied within a wide range of academic disciplines by an even longer list of scholars. Some 
approach the topic from a normative tradition (Habermas 2003; Delanty 2005), while others 
conduct empirical research by applying methods from sociology or political science (e.g. Risse 
2004; Checkel 2005; Bruter 2003; Eder 2009; Duschenne 2006; Jamieson 2002; Laffan 1996; 
Laffan 2004; Hermann et al 2004; Rosamond 1999; Kantner 2006) or by taking an almost 
anthropological starting point (Favell et al 2011; Recchi 2014). Considering this bulk of literature 
on European identity the question begging to be asked is: why another study on the topic? Is there 
really anything left to say? While this is of course a crucial question and one that I will get back to I 
want to start by outlining why the question of European identity seems to have become such a 
topical theme within European integration studies. 
1.1. Why study European identity? 
A very short answer to that question would be: because scholars believe the EU lacks a collective 
identity. As such the question of why it is important to investigate identity formation basically 
relates – as it is so often the case within integration studies – to the fundamental question of what 
the EU is? Few would argue that the EU is in strong need of a collective identity if it amounts to 
nothing more than a “regulatory regime” (Mahone 1994) or a framework for “intergovernmental 
bargaining” (Moravcsik 1993). So how then do scholars engaging in identity research conceive of 
the EU?  
 
Justifying research on European identity researchers usually start out by arguing that the European 
Union has developed into a new type of governance quite different from the agency of earlier stages 
of the integration process (Kaina and Karolewski 2013: 6). Often the Single European Act (1987) 
and the Maastricht Treaty (1993) are identified as pivotal turning points shifting the “modus 
operandi” of the EU: 
 
 “Economic integration reached a peak with the realization of the Single European 
Market when member-states transferred important policy-making competencies to the European 
Union. The Maastricht Treaty, which codifies this transfer of competencies, is actually said to have 
shifted the balance of European government from a formerly predominantly intergovernmental to a 
now mainly supranational mode” (Scheuer and Schmitt 2009: 508). 
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Along with the Maastricht Treaty the width and depth of supranational authority has increased to 
the extent the EU can no longer be categorized simple as an international organisation. Most 
scholars studying European identity now agree that the EU represents a “polity in between” 
showing “some features of a full-fledged national polity, while it lacks other characteristics of a 
modern polity” (Kaina and Karolewski 2013: 6). While the exact nature of the EU is a heavily 
debated question research on European identity is justified to the extent the European Union: 
 
 “Can be analysed as a political community inasmuch as supranational authority (…) 
has been established (…) which governs citizens of a certain territory within a stable and clearly 
defined set of institutions for collective decision making” (ibid.). 
 
Against this backdrop the development of a collective European identity is important because the 
EU comes to rely on the acceptance of affected citizens as policy competencies are transferred to 
the European level (Risse and Grabowsky 2008: 1). In the early stages of European integration the 
operations of the EU was primarily characterized by economic cooperation in low-salient areas 
through administrative means. Under these circumstances: 
 
  “Political debate and consensual forms of legitimitaion (are) eschewed as either 
irrelevant to technical matters or inappropriate” (Bellamy & Castiglione 2000: 3).  
 
During this stage of European integration increased technical efficiency in a limited number of 
economic policy areas resulted in high levels of “output-legitimacy” (Scharpf 1999), in turn giving 
rise to a “permissive consensus”. However, as the scope and pace of European integration has 
increased substantially the permissive consensus has dissolved and been replaced by a 
“constraining dissensus”. This is reflected by a steady decrease in citizens’ support for European 
integration resulting in a growing discrepancy between the European citizens and their elites. 
(Kaina and Karolwski 2013: 7). It is against the backdrop of such apparent legitimacy problems that 
the need for a collective identity within the EU is claimed to be important. As the European 
integration process has entered a new phase characterized by some degree of economic 
redistribution as well as the introduction of majority rule in the decision making process (ibid.) a 
stronger sense of European identity is expected to remedy the legitimacy deficit. At its core this 
argument is based on the functionalist idea that:  
 
 “I accept that things are done to me by others which I accept only by those with whom 
I have a special social relation, a sense of some commonness” (Eder 2009: 4-5). 
 
The question of European identity is an important object of scrutiny simply because the integration 
process has reached an evolutionary stage at which the width and depth of supranational authority 
has rendered impossible the “permissive consensus” of the early years. 
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1.2. What do I mean by European identity? 
If the starting point is that European identity is important because it underpins further integration 
we need to state more precisely what we mean by European identity. If European identity is taken 
to mean something like a sense of identification with the historical or cultural legacy of Europe 
there is no necessary link between identification and support for integration. In fact Eurosceptic 
citizens sometimes evoke a strong European identity as an important aspect of their discontent with 
the EU. A recent example of this was expressed during a social-media debate about the need for 
Europeans to feel a certain degree of affective attachment to the EU. In response Lars Seier 
Christensen, CEO of Saxo Bank and vocal critic of the EU, argued: 
 
 “It is not at all hard to love Europe. It has harboured some of the most important 
intellectuals and richest cultures throughout history and created significant wealth.  What’s hard to 
love is the destruction of this proud history, which the European Union has come to represent” 
(Christensen 2014 translated). 
 
Given the fact that not just any type of European identity underpins European integration we need 
to be clear about which type of identity we are focusing on. In broad terms it is possible to 
distinguish between three cases of collective identity; historical, cultural and political. In this thesis 
I am interested in the dynamics of a political collective identity. Following Hermann et al (2004) I 
argue that such a political identity reflects “whether people in Europe are becoming European in the 
political sense, meaning that they believe Europe is a community that should have its own 
governance” (Hermann et al 2004: viii). In methodological terms it can be rather difficult to 
distinguish between for instance a historical and a political identity. Most research on European 
identity including this thesis applies data from the bi-annual Eurobarometer surveys conducted by 
the Commission. However, these surveys do not include a clear-cut identity distinction when asking 
respondents if, for instance, they feel European. While some might see this as an unbridgeable 
shortcoming I argue that the data can indeed be applied with the purpose of studying a distinctive 
political identity. There are two reasons for this. First, as Bruter (2004) has highlighted, Europeans 
who report feeling European tend to think of Europe in terms of a civic rather than a cultural 
community. Second, and in close continuation of the first, few Europeans actually make the same 
distinction as presented by Lars Seier Christensen above. On the contrary Risse (2004) finds that in 
the minds of most Europeans – both the Eurosceptic and the Eurofanatic - the EU has come 
represent Europe.  
1.3. Why another study on European identity? 
As mentioned above numerous studies have already investigated questions related to European 
identity formation. Therefore this thesis should build upon rather than replicate the findings from 
the bulk of research already conducted. Although it might seem somewhat trivial and 
uncontroversial I would argue that one of the most important findings has been that Europeans have 
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“multiple identities” (Risse 2003). This is an important finding because it highlights how 
individuals can feel as part of not one, but several collectives or communities. In terms of European 
identity formation the concept of “multiple identities” indicates: 
 
  “That it is wrong to conceptualize European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an 
increase in European identity necessarily decreases one’s loyalty to national or other communities” 
(Risse 2003).  
 
Survey data has shown that a majority of Europeans identify both with the nation and with Europe 
in turn suggesting the two identities – contrary to popular wisdom - are not contradictory or 
mutually exclusive. The concept of “multiple identities” indicates that a European identity already 
exists to some extent alongside other identities in the minds of a majority of Europeans. It also 
indicates how a European identity exists in a kind of hierarchical relationship with other 
geographically defined identities. However, the concept does little to increase our understanding of 
when and how a European collective identity emerges, and therefore this is the topic of my thesis. 
With the modest goal of contributing to our understanding of what we might call the dynamics of 
European identity formation I investigate when and how we could expect a collective European 
identity to emerge. My research is based on the following question: 
1.4. Research question 
Under what circumstances could we expect a European collective identity to emerge?  
1.5. Answering my research question 
In order to investigate which circumstances might give rise to a European identity my analysis 
applies self-categorization theory, which is a theory capable of explaining variation in the salience 
of any given group identity (Turner 1999). The starting point of the theory is that collective 
identities take form on the basis of a very basic human need for a social identity. Helping us 
navigate and orient ourselves in a complex social environment we as humans define who we are by 
reference to social categories or groups like for instance “father”, “professor”, “conservative” or 
“Dane” (or perhaps “European”). In the process of allotting ourselves a place in relation to these 
different categories we also categorize others as belonging to this or that group. This process of 
self-categorization creates borders and boundaries between groups determining who are and who 
are not members. When a group of individuals in certain situations and in agreement with each 
other categorize themselves as members of the same group the social identity becomes salient and 
these individuals will mutually recognize each other as members of the same group. This in turn 
gives rise to a particular “we-feeling” among members of that group, which is what we categorize 
as a collective identity. As a result, studying European collective identity formation is about 
studying when and how individuals categorize themselves as Europeans. Or in other words when 
the social European identity is “activated”. 
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Whether or not social identities are activated can be explained by reference to two concepts: 
“situational relevance” and “commitment”. Situational relevance refers to how well the social 
category “fits” the particular situation. As I will elaborate on later the concept of “fit” has a 
normative and comparative component. Both concepts basically tell us that individuals choose to 
categorize themselves as members of a particular group or collective if the internal differences 
between that group of people are perceived as smaller or more insignificant than the external 
differences between the group and other groups. Commitment refers to the fact that “not all 
identities are of equal importance to an actor. In a situation where two identities have situational 
relevance the identity to which an actor is most committed will be activated. When a person is 
committed towards an identity he or she is strongly aware of belonging to a certain group, which is 
expected to increase the likelihood of activating the social identity. Commitment is increased in one 
of two ways. Either through the construction of symbols or narratives about the group or through 
increased interaction among group members. Within groups interaction tends to develop either as a 
means to a particular end (instrumental cooperation) or as an end-goal in itself (interaction with 
intrinsic value). Throughout the rest of the thesis I distinguish between cooperation and interaction 
with the former legitimized as a means to an end and the latter as an end in it self. Self-
categorization theory suggests that a collective identity is more likely to emerge on the back of 
interaction than through cooperation. Based on the theoretical premises of self-categorization theory 
my analysis follows the framework illustrated in table 1 on the next page.  
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Figure 1: Framework for the analysis 
 
 
Following the above-mentioned distinction between “situational relevance” and “commitment” the 
analysis is divided in two main sections. First, based on the notion of “situational relevance” I argue 
that continual constructions of “self and other” in EU foreign policy stimulate the creation of a 
collective European identity by activating a social European identity. If European categorization is 
dependent upon comparative and normative fit we should expect European identity formation to 
include an accentuation of similarities among Europeans and of differences between Europeans and 
non-Europeans. I also show that although images of self and other can be evoked through 
citizenship policies, the EU-citizenship has not increased European identity salience. 
 
Second, based on the notion that “commitment” matters I investigate how collective European 
identities develop in response to cooperation and interaction among Europeans. I pay close attention 
to the distinction between instrumental cooperation and interaction with intrinsic value 
investigating if European identity salience is less pronounced among those engaged in instrumental 
cooperation than among those engaged in interaction with intrinsic value. In terms of instrumental 
Collective European 
identity formation 
Citizens activate a 
European social identity 
Identity activated in response 
to situational relevance  
(Chapter 5) 
European foreign 
policy and EU 
citizenship 
Identity activated on the basis 
of strong commitment towards 
Europe 
(Chapter 6) 
Politics of belonging 
Cooperation and 
interaction within the 
EU 
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cooperation I study European identity salience among officials in the institutions of the EU. This I 
find suitable all the while cooperation and bargaining in the EU institutions (most notably the 
representative institutions) represents a strong example of instrumental cooperation legitimized as a 
means to an end. Studying the type of interaction seen as having a more intrinsic value I look into 
the European public sphere and cross-border mobility within the EU. The choice of looking into 
these two fields is based on the work by Karl Deutsch according to whom “a sense of community” 
(i.e. a collective identity) emerges from increased communication between and mobility among 
members of a community. By reference to the idea that “commitment” is spurred by a strong sense 
of group belonging I also briefly look into the construction of symbols of European integration and 
the effects they might have on collective European identity formation.  
 
Two brief comments should be made on the overall structure of the analysis. First, the distinction 
between circumstances related to “situational relevance” and circumstances related to 
“commitment” is analytical rather than strictly empirical. There is no Chinese wall between 
circumstances increasing the situational relevance of a European identity and those affecting the 
degree of commitment. For instance, I argue that EU’s perceived foreign policy role increases the 
situational relevance of a European identity by creating clear boundaries between Europeans and 
non-European. However, one could also argue that such images of “self and other” increases the 
commitment towards European identity by providing concrete and tangible content to a European 
community. The reason I believe the distinction is helpful is that it highlights how the emergence of 
a collective European identity depends upon processes operating outwardly (situational relevance) 
and processes developing internally (commitment). 
 
Second, although not explicitly highlighted it should be noted that the analysis incorporates two 
different logics of identity formation. Research has shown that collective identities are constructed 
both from the top-down and the bottom up (Recchi 2014). Top down or “culturalist” (ibid) identity 
formation refers to a process whereby identification is linked to and develops on the basis of 
exposure to influential symbols and discourses (Recchi 2014: 2). Bottom up or “structuralist” (ibid.) 
identity formation” explains collective identity formation by reference to fact that individuals in a 
community interact with one another more than with those outside the community. Large parts of 
chapter 5 (Identity formation and foreign policy) include examples of culturalist identity formation 
while most of chapter 6 (Identity formation and interaction) relates to structuralist identity 
formation. 
 
The above has outlined the content of my analysis. However, before getting to that, the next two 
chapters contain in turn a review of the existing literature on European identity formation and a 
thorough account of the slippery and notoriously vague concept of collective identity. 
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2. State of the art: Research on European identity  
As mentioned in the introduction research devoted to the question of European identity has become 
increasingly topical. Scholars from a wide range of academic fields, ranging from sociology over 
political science to anthropology, have approached the topic from various angles contributing to a 
rich and ever expanding bulk of literature. With the purposive positioning the thesis relative to the 
literature the following chapter provides a review of some of the most important research conducted 
on European identity.  
2.1. Integration theory and the question of European identity 
Although the scholarly interest in European identity has been especially pronounced over the course 
of the last two decades it is worth noticing that some of the founding fathers of integration studies 
addressed the topic in their work (Bourne 2014:1). To Ernst B. Hass (1924-2003) European 
integration clearly involves an increased popular identification with Europe resulting from a “shift 
of loyalties” (Hass 1958). In “The Uniting of Europe” Hass famously described political integration 
as: 
 
“The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Hass 1958).  
 
According to Hass supranational identification is not a necessary precondition for political 
integration in Europe, but rather a result of the process. Actors with specific interests favouring 
supranational solutions in certain areas and sectors trigger the demand for integration. Following a 
subsequent “spillover” process these initial steps toward limited integration “trigger endogenous 
economic and political dynamics which provide an impetus for further integration” (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni 2006: 95). Although Hass refers to ‘loyalty towards’ rather than ‘identification with’ 
Europe it is interesting to note how he outlines a process whereby instrumental and rational interests 
leads actors at the national level to endorse supranational action. The shifting of loyalties becomes a 
side-product or result of otherwise instrumental behaviour. According to Hass the degree to which 
new loyalties emerge among actors depends on (A) how successful and effective the performance 
of the supranational institution is perceived to be and (B) for how long a period supranational 
organizations have managed the policy areas to which an actor is engaged (ibid.). With regards to 
(B) Hass even argued that protracted processes of loyalty shifting might lead actors to feel a sense 
of attachment to the new centre independent from any instrumental concerns. 
 
“If the process of developing dual loyalties via this mechanism continues for a sufficiently 
protracted period, the new central institutions may ultimately acquire the symbolic significance of 
end values” (Hass 1958, 14-15 quoted in Risse 2004: 3). 
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Following neofunctionalist assumptions, a collective European identity is a function of the 
(perceived) performance of the supranational institutions of Europe, most notably the European 
Union. Attachment to and identification with Europe is expected to increase as the benefits of 
political, economic and social integration become apparent.  
 
Another seminal integration scholar, Karl W. Deutsch (1912-1992), addressed the question of 
European identity perhaps even more explicitly than Hass. While Ernst B. Haas introduced identity 
related concepts by referring to a “shift of loyalties” Deutsch introduced the notion of a 
transnational “sense of community” (Deutsch et al 1957: 68). Deutsch, whose use of the concept 
relates to the formation of ‘amalgamated security communities’, offers a description of this “sense 
of community”, which is very much in line with the present-day articulations of European identity 
formation: 
 
“The kind of sense of community that is relevant for (European) integration, and therefore for our 
study, turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we-feeling”, trust, and 
mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually 
successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in accordance with it – in short, a 
matter of perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and 
responsiveness in the process of decision-making” (Deutsch et al 1957: 76). 
 
According to Deutsch a sense of community emerges to the extent a number of requirements are 
met. Most notably such community formation requires transnational   “mobility of persons” and 
“multiplicity of transactions” (Deutsch et al 1957: 82-83). According to Deutsch a European-wide 
“sense of community” emerges to the extent that increased political and economic cooperation 
between states facilitates “multiple and growing cross border social interactions – i.e., personal 
interactions and movements – and the individual level” (Favell et al 2011: 32). Furthermore, and 
equally important, Deutsch’s “sense of community” is dependent upon “the scope and strength of a 
wide palette of cross-border exchanges – such as international trade, labour and capital mobility, 
scientific cooperation, cultural activities, the use of non-national media and intermarriages” 
(Deutsch 1954 quoted in Favell et al 2011: 19). Deutsch’s work has been somewhat canonised 
among identity scholars who believe his work provides a useful entry point for studying identity 
formation at the European level. As I will elaborate on later in the thesis, parts of my analysis 
follows what some might call a “Deutschian” approach (Favell et al 2011).  
 
 While Hass and Deutsch both addressed the central role identity played in the process of European 
integration it is, as already mentioned, within the last decades that European identity has gained the 
most significant attention. Reiterating Rosamond’s distinction between “internal” and “external” 
drivers influencing academic work, Bourne (2014) identifies the post-Maastricht environment as 
well as the Eastern enlargement of the EU as important “external” drivers behind the increased 
scholarly interest in European identity. In the following I will make an attempt at providing an 
overview of the relevant literature published in this period. Given the magnitude of the research 
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being conducted on European identity these years I do not expect to cover all aspects of the 
literature, but rather to illustrate the major themes and discussions. I believe the literature on 
European identity is structured around four major themes.  
2.2. Normative and empirical approaches 
The perhaps most important dividing line within the literature runs between scholars approaching 
the question of European identity from a normative basis and those studying European identity 
empirically. The former group is concerned with the question of what the substance or content of a 
possible European collective identity should be (Kaina and Karolewski 2013: 18). The German 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas is one of the most prominent scholars within this normative tradition. 
Working within the context of post national democracy and citizenship in the EU Habermas has 
written extensively about the possible content of a European identity. Habermas (2003) is optimistic 
about the prospects of a collective European identity arguing there is no reason as to why the 
process of creating national consciousness and civic solidarity so decisive in the formation of 
European nation states in the nineteenth century should not continue beyond national borders 
(Habermas 2003: 98). Habermas’ optimism derives from his explicitly constructivist understanding 
of collective identity. Rather than being a fixed or static product, which individuals simple inherit, 
identity “is an artifact of political practice (…) more specifically public deliberation” (Hayward 
2007: 184). Emerging from such public deliberation is a “constitutional patriotism”, which is a form 
of collective identity “citizens create and re-create by participating in collective deliberation about 
how to interpret and institutionalize principles of constitutional democracy” (ibid.). Constitutional 
patriotism thus represents a way of creating a strong collective identity independent from any sense 
of shared cultural, historical or racial heritage. In a multicultural and multilingual Europe Habermas 
finds this to be the most suitable basis for a transnational European identity. A critical note on the 
idea of constitutional patriotism as the bedrock for European identity can be drawn from Smith 
(1993). Following his research on nationalism Smith emphasizes the importance of social and 
cultural aspects in the process of collective identity formation. Since there are more myths, symbols 
and values dividing Europeans than uniting them, and since Europe “lacks a secure ethnic base with 
a clear-cut set of common historical memories” it is unlikely that a strong European identity capable 
of generating enthusiasm and support will emerge in the near future. Delanty (2005) is critical of 
Habermas’ conception of a European identity arguing that it neglects cultural aspects in favour of 
political and judicial principals thereby presenting itself as a sort of “constitutional securalism” 
(Delanty 2005: 413).  According to Delanty a European identity should emerge on the basis of 
cosmopolitanism, which entails not only commitment to constitutional procedural norms, but also a 
strong recognition of diversity (ibid: 416). Therefore, Delanty is critical of attempts at building an 
overarching and all-embracing European identity reminiscent of the nineteenth century nation-state. 
Rather, a European identity emerges from and is dependent upon the cosmopolitan currents that are 
currently transforming national identities. Since cosmopolitanism is not an isolated European 
tendency, European identity will present itself as an instance of cosmopolitan post-nationalism 
rather than a specific and exclusive phenomenon (ibid.). 
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While normative accounts of European identity like those presented by Habermas (2003) and 
Delanty (2005) focus on the possible and desirable substance of a collective identity empirical 
approaches – as this thesis is an example of - are interested in assessing the extent to which a 
European collective identity is actually emerging. Empirical research on European identity is 
essentially multidisciplinary and varies along a number of methodological and theoretical 
dimensions. 
2.3. The distinction between Europe’s identity and the EU’s identity 
Looking through the research on European identity it does at times seem unclear whether the object 
of study is Europe’s identity or the European Union’s identity. This does give rise to some 
confusion since Europe and the EU - for obvious reasons – differ. As Risse (2004) points out 
“people may feel a sense of belonging to Europe in general, while feeling no attachment to the EU 
at all – and vice versa”. Addressing the differences between the two, Delanty (2012) argues that it 
makes sense to speak of a collective identity within the European Union since a collective identity 
always presupposes a collective actor. For this reason, Delanty argues, Europe cannot have a 
collective identity since there is no “European people”. Instead Delanty prefers to speak of a 
broader European identity as an instance of  “societal identity” characterized by being less “clear 
cut” and more “ambivalent” (Delanty 2012: 3).  
 
.Delanty’s distinction between Europe and the EU is an important one and finds resonance with 
other identity scholars. Based on his work on European identity formation Bruter (2005) proposes a 
distinction between “cultural identity” and “civic identity” within Europe. While the former refers 
to citizens’ identification with a human community within Europe, the latter has to do with their 
identification with a specific political system comprised by the European Union. In his research 
Bruter has found more evidence of a collective civic identity than of a collective cultural identity 
(Bruter 2005).  
 
While it is important to be aware of the differences between European and EU identity, it also 
worth noticing that the distinction between the two categories has become blurred in the minds of 
most Europeans. Risse (2004) reports that the EU - in large part thanks to its active attempts at 
promoting a collective identity – has successfully achieved “identity hegemony” in two ways. 
Firstly, in terms of “increasingly defining what it means to belong to Europe” and secondly, in the 
sense that “Europe increasingly denotes the political and social space occupied by EU” (Risse 
2004:9). Such findings challenge Delanty’s distinction and render it possible to refer to European 
and EU identity interchangeably. Therefore, and as mentioned in the introduction, I find it fair to 
refer to EU and Europe interchangeably. 
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2.4. Different levels of European identity  
The concept of identity is itself notoriously vague lacking a clear-cut definition (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000). As a result the literature provides a number of different understandings of what 
European identity actually refers to and, most notably, where to look for it?  
 
One group of scholars locate it at the individual level understanding European identity as the degree 
to which European citizens themselves identify with Europe and its institutions. Such research often 
deals with the questions of whether, to what extent and for what reasons Europeans identify with or 
feel a sense of belonging towards Europe. The results from these types of studies vary between 
optimism and doubt. Some researchers focusing on individual identification finds indicators 
suggesting an emerging European identity (Scheuer and Schmitt 2009; Caporaso and Kim 2009). 
For instance, Scheuer and Schmitt (2009) conclude that a collective identity understood as a “sense 
of community” among EU-citizens has developed based on their work analysing EU citizens’ 
identification with the Union as well as their trust in citizens from other member states. Other 
scholars are more sceptical noting that the empirical data available is not sufficient to support 
claims about a collective European identity (e.g. Duchesne 2008). Through the research on 
individual’s identification with Europe or the EU we have learned a great deal about why and how 
Europeans identify with the European level. Two insights are worth highlighting. First, scholars 
have been capable of developing predictors of strong individual identification with Europe. For 
instance, Favell et al (2011) report that well educated as well as young people and those engaged in 
cross-border mobility are more likely to identify with the European Union. Second, the research has 
proved that citizens have “multiple identities” (Risse 2004) indicating that the relationship between 
national and European identification should not be understood in zero-sum terms. In fact, as Risse 
(2004) emphasizes most Europeans today identify both with the nation state to which they belong 
and with Europe. 
 
Another group of scholars focus less on individual identification with Europe and more on the 
identity of the European Union. Such research often follows a social constructivist tradition 
according to which Europe or the EU has no fixed or predetermined identity. In contrast, the 
starting point is that European identity is continuously produced and reproduced through discourses 
among elites or in transnational organizations like the EU. Marcussen et al (1999) investigate how 
European identity is constructed among political elites in Germany, France and Great Britain 
showing that competing views exist and that Europe takes on a different meaning dependent on the 
national context. Placing the same emphasis on the critical role of discourses Rosamond (1999) 
describes how ideas about globalization have been “central to the development of a particular 
notion of European identity among elite policy actors”. One could also argue that research on the 
EU’s role as a “normative power” in global politics involves an explicit focus on the collective 
identity of Europe understood as specific norms embedded in and promoted by the EU. Manners 
(2006) identifies nine so called “constitutive norms” of the EU inscribed in treaties, charters and 
official statements. For instance, Manners finds an adherence to democracy to be a corner stone in 
the EU’s identity most notably exemplified by the Copenhagen Criteria (1993) in which it is stated 
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that accession to the Union requires, among other things, stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy. As should hopefully be clear by now this thesis is positioned in line with the first of the 
groups in that it is mainly concerned with Europeans’ degree of identification with Europe.  
2.5. Studying identity as the dependent or independent variable 
While some scholars are interested in outlining how and to what extent a European identity is 
developing, others focus on the effects European identity might have on other conditions. This latter 
group study European identity as an “independent variable” and are mainly concerned with the 
individual level of European identity focusing for instance on the affects European identification 
has on an individuals willingness to accept binding decisions from the EU (Kaina and Karolewski 
2013). An example of research focusing on identity as the independent variable is provided by Van 
der Veen (2010) who investigates the causal linkages between on the one hand individuals’ 
identification with Europe and on the other hand their support for the European Union.  
 
Research investigating how and why European identity might be developing focus on identity as the 
“dependent variable” understood as the output of a process. The work by Checkel (2001) on social 
learning in the EU is an example of such an approach as it outlines a process through which 
individuals exposed to certain norms come to take on new identities. The research on European 
identity as a dependent variable offers two different but not mutually exclusive accounts of how a 
collective transnational identity emerges. On the one hand scholars argue that identity formation 
takes place from the “top down” (Bruter 2005) through “culturalist processes” (Recchi 2014). Such 
processes entail “mechanisms in which identification with Europe (…) is internalized and comes 
about through the exposure to influential discourses and symbols”. On the other hand scholars also 
acknowledge how identity formation can take place from the “bottom up” (Bruter 2005) through 
“structuralist processes” (Recchi 2014). In contrast to culturalist identity formation, the structuralist 
approach emphasizes the important role of social interaction emphasizing how collective identity 
arises from interacting or associating with other and coming to the realisation that one has much in 
common with them. 
 
Given the review presented here it might be helpful to provide a short recap of how the thesis 
positions itself in relation to the state of the art. Along the lines of the divide between normative and 
empirical approaches the thesis takes the latter approach by studying under what circumstances a 
collective identity emerges. As this suggest I am studying identity as a dependent rather than 
independent variable. Despite the differences between EU and Europe I apply the two concepts 
interchangeably given the fact that to most Europeans EU has come to represent Europe. Finally, it 
should be highlighted that the thesis studies identity at the individual level focusing on the degree of 
identification among Europeans. 
 !  
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3. Understanding collective identity 
So far I have referred to collective identity in a rather casual manner. However, anyone applying the 
concept of identity in academic work must be very careful to outline in precise terms what is 
understood by it. This is important because identity is one of those concepts that are often evoked 
rather casually in everyday language. Most people therefore have their own idea albeit vague notion 
of what identity refers to. To minimize the risk of confusion on this account the following chapter 
outlines the concept and works towards an operationalization.  
3.1. Levels of identity 
How should we understand and define a collective identity? A common entry point is to place 
collective identities within the context of different types and levels of identity to illustrate how the 
concept is related to and distinguished from these. Snow (2001) distinguishes between three 
conceptually distinct types of identity: “personal, social and collective” (Snow, 2001: 2) Social 
identities are “the identities attributed or imputed to others in attempts to situate them in social 
space” (ibid.). Often such identities are grounded in specific professions or social roles such as 
“teacher”, “professor”, “student”, “father” or “mother”. The concept of social identities resembles 
what has been categorizes as “role identities” (Fearon, 1999) or “categorical identities” (Calhoun 
1997). According to Fearon (1999) the most characteristic aspect of such identities is that they 
“refer to labels applied to people who are expected or obligated to perform some set of actions, 
behaviours, routines or functions in particular situations” (Fearon, 1999: 17). Next Snow defines 
personal identities as “the attributes and meanings attributed to oneself” and “the self-designations 
and self-attributions regarded as personally distinctive” (Snow 2001:2). Following Snows 
terminology this leaves us with the concept of collective identity. This is a difficult concept to 
define unambiguously since it has been given a variety of different meanings by different scholars 
and within different academic fields. Before outlining the understanding of collective identity 
applied in this thesis I find it necessary to address the confusion surrounding the concept. 
3.2. The multiple understandings of collective identity  
The confusion surrounding the concept of identity has much to do with how it is applied in different 
ways within a wide variety of fields in the social sciences and humanities (Triandafyllidou and 
Wodak 2003: 206). Because of this widespread and cross-disciplinary application some scholars 
argue that the concept of identity itself has been stripped of any clear-cut and applicable definition. 
At best the concept is theoretically overstretched or ambiguous - at worst perplexing and maybe 
even misleading.  
 
Brubaker and Cooper (2000) have delivered one of the most widely cited criticisms of the identity 
concept. They argue that the social and political sciences should abandon identity as an analytical 
category altogether since it “is to ambiguous (…) to serve well the demands of social analysis” 
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(Brubaker & Cooper, 2000: 1). The ambiguity of the concept, they argue, derives largely from the 
fact that it has been attributed a variety of meanings. They list several of which four are worth 
highlighting.  
 
First, identity is often used to describe a core aspect of the selfhood of individuals or communities 
and ”invoked to point to something allegedly deep, basic, abiding, or foundational” as opposed to 
“more superficial, accidental, fleeting or contingent aspects or attributes of the self” (ibid: 7). Many 
identity scholars – especially those following a psychological tradition – apply this usage of the 
term in emphasizing how identity and some sense of continuity of self “is intrinsic to the human 
condition” (Jamieson 2002: 3). 
 
Second, the concept of identity is frequently understood as the basis for political action. In these 
cases identity is contrasted to interests with the intention of indicating that the incentive for action 
has a non-instrumental nature (Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 7). In other words, the concept is evoked 
to “underscore the manner in which action – individual or collective – may be governed by 
particularistic self-understandings rather than by putatively universal self-interests” (ibid.). This is a 
use of the term, which has often been applied within the field of international relations by scholars 
addressing the difficulty of explaining the behaviour of actors on the basis of material interests. For 
instance, in “Norms and Identity in World Politics” Katzenstein (1996) argues that variations in 
behaviour can be explained by reference to “the issue of identity” (Katzenstein 1996: 15 quoted in 
Weller 1997: 15).  
 
Third, identity can refer to a specifically collective phenomenon denoting a fundamental sameness 
among members of a particular group or collective (Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 7). This collective or 
group identity is expected to manifest itself through a shared worldview or shared goals and through 
the existence of a high level of solidarity between group members. The view of identity as being a 
specifically collective concept is expressed through the literature on nationalism and national 
identity, race and gender (ibid.).  
 
Fourth, many scholars underscore the socially constructed nature of the concept. They understand 
collective identities as the result of dialogue, conflict or interaction within groups or communities 
attempting to determine their collective self-understanding - that is the answer to question “Who are 
We”?  This usage is based on a processual, interactive and contingent understanding of identity and 
therefore somewhat at odds with the first notion of identity outline above, which emphasized the 
“abiding” and “foundational” nature of identity. Scholars working within a constructivist 
framework (see Wendt 1994; Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995; Eder 2009; Rosamond 1999) as well as 
scholars applying discourse analyses follow this conception of identity. Eder’s (2009) definition of 
collective identity is an apt example of this particular notion of the concept: “Collective identities 
are narrative constructions which permit the control of the boundaries of a network of actors”.  
 
Kaina and Karolewski (2013) seem to agree with Brubaker and Cooper when they argue, “the broad 
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field of social sciences provides a variety of conceptualizations of both individual and collective 
identity” (Kaina and Karolewski 2013: 15). At an overall level they find two different notions of the 
concept. First, identity can be understood as something a person or a group is, understood as 
something along the lines of a self-image or self-concept (ibid.). Second, identity is sometimes 
referred to as something persons or groups of people have. Following this understanding identity 
relates to “associating oneself with something or someone else”(ibid.). 
 
The ambiguous and somewhat diverse application of the identity concept characterizing identity 
scholarship in general seems also to apply to identity scholarship within the specific context of 
European integration. The range of research on European identity – which has increased 
substantially throughout the last decades – includes many different conceptions of collective 
identity. Therefore European identity has come to take on different and sometimes conflicting 
meanings. Delanty (2012) has identified at least three different meanings of the concept. First, 
several scholars studying European collective identity have focused on individuals’ identification 
with “Europe” understood as a social category. That is, they have located European identity at the 
level of individuals (Delanty 2012: 2). Second, others have argued that European identity should be 
understood as the identity of collective actors such as the EU. In other words, they find that the EU 
has an identity, which is in some sense European (ibid.). Following this line of though collective 
European identity comes to refer to something like the “Idea of Europe” or “Europe’s spirit”. Third, 
collective European identity has been understood as something above and beyond the institutions of 
the European community. European collective identity then derives from the cultural and historical 
heritage of Europe and the shared past of all its citizens (ibid.). 
 
As the above indicates collective identity has been put to use in a wide variety of different contexts 
to describe often quite different social phenomena. The question then is whether this amounts to an 
irreversible theoretical shortcoming following from which the concept should be abandoned as 
proposed by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper. The short answer is no. Collective identity is 
an important and concept and should not be abandoned. It provides added theoretical value by 
capturing aspects of social relations and collective action not adequately described by other 
concepts (e.g. Kantner 2006; Weller 1997; Kaina & Karolewski 2013). Human interaction and 
social relations often have a non-instrumental mode not characterized by instrumental and interest-
driven behaviour based on calculation of costs and benefits. In these cases we need the concept of 
collective identity to describe the non-instrumental dimensions (Caporaso and Kim 2009: 21). A 
similar defence of the concept can be found in Kantner (2006). In response to Brubaker and 
Cooper’s criticism she argues:  
 
“Collective identity is an indispensible concept (…) needed in order to theorize and to 
conduct empirical research about value-oriented collective action. We need some conceptual tools 
in order to handle those ‘thick’ ethical convictions for which the members of a community 
sometimes fight passionately (…). Obviously, in those cases we are observing not merely an 
accumulation of individuals (…) In these cases we are dealing with a very special quality of social 
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relations” (Kantner, 2006: 506f).  
 
Following along these lines other scholars argue that identity, as a concept cannot be abandoned by 
the social sciences since it is simple too important an aspect of social life. Kaina and Karolewski 
(2013) even argue, “in the long run both individuals and human groups cannot live without 
identity”. Having an identity therefore must be understood as a “psychological imperative as well as 
a sociological constant”.  
 
While not being ready to leave identity behind altogether, most scholars agree that the concept has 
been theoretically overstretched and that the conceptual ambiguity must be addressed if identity is 
to function well as an analytical concept.  
3.3. How to make sense of a collective identity 
This thesis follows an understanding of identity that is in line with the third of the four identity 
meanings outlined by Brubaker and Cooper. That is, I understand collective identity as group 
phenomenon expressing some degree of sameness (perceived or real) among group members. 
Although no consensual definition of the term exists I believe Snow (2001) provides a helpful 
definition, which few scholars would object strongly to. Covering the most important aspects of the 
concept it defines collective identity in the following way: 
 
 “Its essence resides in a shared sense of “one-ness” or “we-ness” anchored in real or 
imagined shared attributes and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity and in 
relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of ‘others’ ”  (Snow 2001: 2). 
 
I believe this definition gives rise to two important comments about the general nature of collective 
identities, which should be mentioned to avoid confusion. The first is epistemological and the 
second ontological.  
 
First, the definition states that collective identity at its core is a “shared sense of we-ness”. This is a 
troublesome definition, which tends to challenge scholars trying to measure collective identities. 
The reason is the following. A shared sense of “we-ness” among members of a collective or a group 
expresses itself through two separate but interrelated phenomena. On the one hand each member of 
the group feels a personal attachment to or identification with the group understood as a social 
entity. This in itself is however not enough to create a collective identity since it only refers to the 
degree of attachment an individual feels towards the group. It does not take into account whether or 
not the other members of the group accept him or her as a legitimate member of the group. In 
theory therefore we could have a number of people each feeling “European” without however 
recognizing the others who share the same sentiment as associates. In such a case what is being 
measured is a social rather than a collective identity. Therefore, on the other hand, this sense of 
“we-ness” also expresses itself as an intersubjective or shared mutual acceptance of each other as 
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associates of the same group. The literature provides plenty of examples of scholars reflecting upon 
this issue. Kaina and Karolewski (2013) address the issue by arguing that collective identities 
contain both vertical and horizontal relationships.  The vertical relationship works at the individual 
level expressing a person’s attachment to a group, and not the group or collective’s acceptance of 
him or her as a member. The horizontal dimension refers to the relationship between the members 
of the collective. Such relationships are characterized by an in-group sense of “belonging together” 
understood as the “group member’s mutual acceptance as associates of one and the same collective” 
(ibid.). 
 
The fact that collective identities depend upon both vertical and horizontal relationships presents 
scholars with a methodological challenge. The degree of vertical attachment between an individual 
and a group can be measured fairly easily through surveys asking individuals to what extent they 
feel a sense of belonging to a group. In the context of European identity formation, the European 
Commission does this in the bi-annual Eurobarometer surveys asking respondents to what extent 
they see themselves as Europeans. Meanwhile however the horizontal relationship is extremely 
difficult to study since it is hidden in the aggregated individual responses. Like most research on 
European collective identity formation this thesis relies upon Eurobarometer survey data. 
Eurobarometer data provide a reliable, large-scale and longitudinal tool of measurement, but 
addresses only the vertical sense of belonging. This is, as the above should illustrate, a 
methodological shortcoming, but one that I believe is very difficult to overcome given the 
intersubjective nature of the horizontal sense of belonging.  
 
I mention all of this to avoid confusion. By focusing on the vertical component of collective identity 
I believe it is more precise to refer to European identification rather than European collective 
identity since it is necessary to include both vertical and horizontal dimensions to make substantial 
claims about the latter. I therefore find it confusing when individual identification and collective 
identity are conflated as when Polletta and Jasper (2001) define collective identity as an 
“individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category or 
institution” (Polletta & Jasper 2001: 285). This is not to say that identification and collective 
identity are two unrelated components since the latter as illustrated above depends upon the former. 
In sum, a collective European identity depends upon, but should not be equated with, the degree to 
which Europeans identify with Europe. This is important to keep in mind when reading the thesis.  
 
The second comment relates to the part of Snow’s definition stating that collective identities are 
anchored in real or imagined shared attributes. The distinction between “real” or “imagined” shared 
attributes is invoked to suggest two different “ideal-type” understandings of collective identity: an 
essentialist claiming that the shared attributes upon which collective identities rest are natural and 
stable and a constructivist claiming that they are socially constructed and contingent. Often 
researchers studying collective identity formation start out by rejecting essentialist claims and 
placing themselves within a constructivist approach (e.g. Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995). However, 
given the fact that none or very few identity scholars claim that collective identities are in any way 
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natural objects, I believe it is important to describe in a bit more detail the added value of the social 
constructivist approach. Following Fearon (1999) the key insight from social constructivism is not 
simply that collective identities are constructed but rather that “social processes beyond the 
individuals control crucially shapes something that the individual may understand as deeply 
personal” (Fearon 1999: 16). Social constructivism therefore implies that social processes above 
and beyond the individual affect the vertical sense of identification outlined above. In other words, 
the groups or collectives to whom an individual feels attached vary in response to social processes 
implying a dynamic process in which collective identities have a temporal and context specific 
nature. This is indeed what Risse (2004) seems to be referring to when he concludes that individuals 
have “multiple identities”. 
 
Based on Snow’s definition and the two comments made above we are left with three basic claims 
about collective identity. First, a collective identity refers to a shared sense of “we-ness” among a 
group of people. Second, collective identities are dependent upon and emerge from individuals 
identifying vertically with a group or a collective. Third, individuals’ sense of group affiliation 
varies in response to social factors indicating that collective identities are temporal and context 
specific. 
 
A common problem when working with collective identity formation is the large gap between 
conceptual definitions and empirical observations (Caporaso and Kim 2009: 23). Developing 
indicators can reduce this gap. However, in order to develop indicators of European collective 
identity formation we need to explore in more detail the characteristics of collective identities and 
the processes through which it emerges.  
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4. How collective identities emerge 
As outlined in the previous chapter I argue that collective identities emerge from and depend upon 
individuals identifying themselves as group members in response to social processes. This simple 
statement is however inconclusive leaving aside any kind of description of the causal mechanisms 
between individual identification and collective identity formation. Furthermore it offers no 
clarification in terms of the social circumstances expected to affect individual identification. In the 
following section I try to remedy these theoretical shortcomings. 
4.1. The process of self-categorization 
Taking individual identification as the starting point for collective identity formation I place myself 
firmly within the confines of self-categorization theory (see Oakes et al 1994) developed on the 
findings from social identity theory. The theory claims that collective identities are firmly rooted in 
and emerge from what they characterize as social identities. In fact social identity theory challenges 
the validity of a three-part model as the one outlined by Snow. Instead the theory claims that social 
identities most often constitute personal identities. All humans have a basic need for social identity 
meaning that “we have to define who we are with the help of social categories” (Weller 1997: 28). 
Social categories resembles the role identities and categorical identities already described, and 
according to social identity theory our sense of self is derived by attributing ourselves and others to 
various social categories. Through identification with social categories: 
 
“We classify others as members of this or that group and we also allot ourselves a 
place in relation to these very groups. In other words, our feeling of identity is closely connected 
with our membership of various groups” (Brown 1990: 420 cited in Weller 1997: 28).  
 
In this way social identity theory emphasizes the social nature of an individual’s personal identity 
indicating that a sense of self to a large extent arises, not from personally distinctive trademarks or 
self-images, but from identification with social categories, groups of people and communities. This 
however doesn’t mean that social identity theory equates social and collective identities, so the 
question then is, how do collective identities arise from this social component of an individual’s 
identity? Weller (1997) describes the process in the following way: 
 
“As human beings create a social identity for themselves (…) the categorizations 
made in the course of the perception of the social world acquire a specific significance: they form 
the boundary between ingroup and outgroup. This means that a feeling of belonging arises among 
members of the ingroup when, in certain situations and in agreement with one another, they 
categorize the social world in such a way that each of them individually recognizes the others as 
members of this group” (Weller 1997: 28).  
 
An important component of collective identity is this notion of in-group identification, which 
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allows for members to recognize one another as members of the particular collective. By ascribing 
oneself in certain situations to a particular social category with some defining characteristics 
individuals are able to recognize others as members of that category group. This process closely 
resembles Hoog & Abram’s (1988) notion of self-categorization, which they see as the explanation 
of how individual identity is transformed to a collective identity. 
 
“Just as we categorize objects, experiences and other people, we also categorize 
ourselves. The outcome of this process of self-categorization is an accentuation of similarities 
between self and other ingroupers and differences between self and outgroupers” (Hogg & Abrams 
1988: 17 cited in Neumann 1996: 6).  
 
It is important to note that the process of self-categorization occurs in response to external social 
dynamics and that any individual has a number of social identities capable in turn of becoming 
salient. The same person categorizing herself as European in one context might categorize herself as 
“professor”, “woman” or “mother” in another. As several critics have noted this seems to support a 
notion of identity that is at odds with the common understanding that identity refers to something 
more or less fundamental or abiding. If the same individual takes on different social identities 
depending on the social context how then does identity differ from concepts like “interests” or 
“preferences”? Such criticism, fair as it might seem, is based on the wrong assumption that citizens 
hold only one or very few social identities and that different social identities exist in a zero sum 
relation. If that were the case then it would indeed be difficult to accept the basic premises of self- 
categorization theory. However as Risse (2004) has shown individuals are capable of holding 
multiple identities without compromising the deep, abiding and foundational nature of those 
identities. As Risse argues collectives are “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991) and people are 
capable of feeling as part of several communities without having to choose one primary (Risse 
2004: 2). 
 
The definitions of the self-categorization process provided above by Weller as well as Hogg and 
Abrams both emphasize the importance of accentuating similarities among group members. The 
key component in terms of offsetting internal differences is the logic of  “depersonalized”. Turner 
(1999) describes the concept in the following way: 
 
“The central hypothesis for group behaviour is that, as a shared social identity 
becomes salient, individual self-perception tends to become depersonalized. That is individuals tend 
to define and see themselves less as differing individual persons and more as the interchangeable 
representatives of some shared social category membership”  
 
An individual who categorizes herself as European in contrast to for instance American will tend to 
downplay or pay less attention to the differences between herself and other Europeans while 
accentuating similarities. At the same time the perceived stereotypical differences between 
Europeans and Americans will be enhanced (Turner 1999). Following this process the concept of 
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depersonalization is key to understanding the formation of collective identities. According to self-
categorization theory the logic of depersonalization becomes stronger and more pronounced the 
larger the group is (Weller 1997: 31). In other words, and perhaps not surprisingly, it is more 
important to disregard intra-group differences if a strong national or supranational identity is to 
emerge than in the case of a collective identity among for instance colleagues at the workplace.  
 
While it has so far been described how collective identities emerge from self-categorization and are 
consolidated through processes of depersonalization it is still unclear which collective identities 
emerge in which situations? In other words, we still need to describe why under certain 
circumstances one particular social identity becomes salient given the entire range of potential 
social identities available. In this regard Anderson (2010) offers a helpful explanation. Which 
particular social identities are activated, he argues, depends on “situational relevance” and 
“commitment” (Anderson 2010: 48). Situational relevance refers to how well the social category 
“fits” the particular situation. Fit in turn has two components: comparative fit and normative fit. 
 
Comparative fit is often understood by reference to the “meta-contrast principle” within self-
categorization. Oakes et al (1994) describes the principle as a: 
 
“Judgement of difference between differences. The meta-contrast principle predicts 
that a given set of items is more likely to be categorized as single entity to the degree that the 
differences within that set of items are less than the differences between that set and other within 
the comparative context” (Oakes et al 1994 cited in ibid: 31).  
 
What this means is that individuals choose to categorize a particular group of people as a collective 
if and only if the internal differences between that group of people are perceived as smaller or more 
insignificant than the external differences between the group and other groups. While the meta-
contrast principle entails a judgement of differences among differences it is important to note than 
in each situation there are not an infinite number of social identities to “choose” between (ibid.). 
Very often in fact the social context in which we find ourselves renders only a limited number of 
categorizations “appropriate”. During the World Cup or the Olympics national identities are evoked 
because nationality than becomes the main indicator of difference. Meanwhile during, for instance, 
a national election, collective identity emerges among members of political parties since then 
differences are structured around ideology. In the literature the meta-contrast principle is also 
referred to as “comparative fit” (Turner 1999).  
 
While comparative fit emphasizes the importance of “differences between differences” the 
“normative fit” relates to question of whether the differences between the activated category and 
other categories as well as the perceived similarities within the category are in line with our 
“normative beliefs about the substantive social meaning of the social category” (Turner 1999). To 
revisit the example provided above, if women are to categorize themselves as such in contrast to 
men it is not only important that the differences among women are perceived as smaller than the 
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differences between men and women. It is equally important that the differences are in line with 
stereotypical thoughts about the two genders. If a category has both comparative and normative fit 
the literature often refers to it as having “situational relevance”.  
 
A number of scholars have criticized this notion that collective identities emerge from 
categorization based on situational relevance. Referring to the “categorization trap” Kantner (2006) 
argues that collective identities contain an affective dimension, which is not sufficiently captured by 
processes of categorization. Just because an individual evokes a particular categorization “we don’t 
know whether the chosen characteristics are relevant to the individual concerned (Kantner 2006: 
507).  On the same note Risse (2004) distinguishes between an evaluative and affective component 
of collective identity with the latter referring to the degree to which a social identity is relevant and 
meaningful to the individual. 
 
To evoke this affective component self-categorization theory claims that social identities are 
activated not simple in response to situational relevance but also in accordance with the level of 
“commitment” an individual feel towards a social identity. According to Anderson (2010) the 
concept refers to the fact that “not all identities are of equal importance to an actor. In a situation 
where two identities have situational relevance the identity to which an actor is most committed will 
be activated” (Anderson 2010: 49). In the literature commitment is also referred to as “relative 
accessibility” (Turner 1999) and “perceiver readiness” (McGarty 1999). Regardless of the exact 
term applied the concept reflects: 
 
 “A persons past experience, present expectations, and current motives, values, goals, 
and needs. It reflects the active selectivity of (…) being ready to use the categories” (Turner 1999). 
 
When a person is committed towards an identity he or she is strongly aware of belonging to a 
certain group, which is expected to increase the likelihood of activating the social identity. 
Commitment is increased in one of two ways. Either through the construction of symbols or 
narratives about the group or through increased interaction among group members. Within groups 
interaction and cooperation tends to develop either as a means to a particular end (instrumental) or 
as an end-goal in itself (intrinsic). Self-categorization theory suggests that a collective identity is 
more likely to emerge if the interaction within a group is legitimized as having intrinsic value. 
 
I believe self-categorization theory provides a very useful framework for understanding the 
dynamics of collective identity formation in Europe. By reference to the concepts of self-
categorization and depersonalization the theory describes how social identities at the individual 
level are transformed to collective identities at the collective level. Meanwhile, the concepts of 
“commitment” and “fit” help us understand why in certain situations a particular categorization is 
chosen over others.   
 
Based on the most important features of self-categorization theory as outlined above I believe we 
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can draw some preliminary statements about the potential for a European collective identity. A 
European collective identity is set to emerge under circumstances where the social European 
identity “fits” the particular social context or where Europeans are become strongly committed 
towards a European identity. Given the meta-contrast principle we should expect a European 
identity to be fitting under circumstances where the differences among Europeans are perceived as 
being smaller and less significant than the differences between Europeans and non-Europeans. 
Furthermore we should expect to see a collective European identity to emerge on the back of 
particular types of interaction among Europeans.  
4.2. Some critical reflections on self-categorization theory 
Before moving on to the analysis a critical comment and some methodological clarification is 
needed. Reflecting upon the basis premises of self-categorization theory one could argue that the 
theory draws a perhaps to simplistic of superficial image of social identities. As I have outlined the 
theory above readers could get the impression that social identities exist as closed and fully formed 
identities being activated in turn given the social context. In other words, that identity formation 
relates to activation of otherwise stable identities. This is of course a misleading account as it stands 
in firm opposition to the almost universally accepted claim that identities are contingent 
constructions. Therefore I would argue that it is important to keep in mind that the processes 
determining if an identity has situational relevance also influence the content of those same social 
identities. For instance, in the unlikely event Europe is presented by some common threat a 
European identity might be likely to gain situational relevance. At the same time the content of that 
that European identity category will be altered by the presence of that threat. Having a European 
identity might then come to represent an opposition to or fear of that external threat. This suggests a 
continual interplay between the processes forming collective identities and the content of those 
same collective identities, which is important to keep in mind when studying European identity 
formation. 
4.3. What does self-categorization theory tell us about European identity? 
The basic premise of self-categorization theory is that a number of different collective identity 
configurations are capable of emerging depending on which social identities become salient. In 
other words, the starting point is that individuals have multiple social identities existing alongside 
each other. The notion of multiple identities is confirmed when looking at the empirical data 
provided by the bi-annual Eurobarometer surveys. Since 1992 the EU-commission has asked 
respondents across Europe whether they, in the near future, will see themselves as nationals, 
Europeans or both. The responses are illustrated in figure 2 on the next page. 
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Figure 2: Share of Europeans who feel European, national or both 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer Interactive Search System 
 
As table 1 illustrates the two responses “National only” and “(National) and European” are by far 
the most common. Meanwhile, throughout the entire period less than 10% of respondents reply 
seeing themselves as more European than national. However, it is worth noticing that except for the 
period from 1996-1999 and the year 2010 the share of respondents who see themselves as nationals 
first and European second exceeds the share of respondents who only see themselves as nationals.  
 
The important finding is that the majority of Europeans have multiple identities identifying with 
both the nation state and Europe. This finding confirms the conclusion drawn by Risse (2004) who 
argues that, contrary to popular wisdom, the main dividing line in terms of citizens’ identification is 
not between those who feel only European and those who feel only national, but between those who 
identity exclusively with the nation-state and those who identify with both their nation state and 
Europe. A collective European identity is therefore conceivable without the abolishment of national 
identities (Caporaso and Kim 2009) 
 
This is in line with self-categorization theory and the notion that individuals have multiple 
identities. The social identities of Europeans exist along side each other in a dynamic relationship 
rather than in a zero-sum competition. In response to situational relevance and commitment one or 
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the other becomes salient. It is important to note that multiple identities refer not only to 
geographically rooted identities. In addition to a European social identity any European might also, 
given the situation, categorize him or herself as for instance “mother”, “father”, “doctor”, “teacher”, 
“liberal” or “conservative”.  
 
I believe this is the core characteristic of the context in which we study European identity. We 
should not expect a European identity to emerge as a supranational identity above and beyond other 
social identities. Neither should we expect a European identity to be salient in the minds of 
Europeans at all times. In line with self-categorization theory a European identity is one among 
numerous social identities emerging in response to situational relevance and commitment. In turn 
the next two chapters look into circumstances under which the situational relevance of and the 
commitment towards a European identity could increase. 
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5. Identity formation in response to constructions of self and other 
The concept of situational relevance is helpful in that it emphasizes the relational dimension of 
collective identity formation. In the following I argue that processes of increasing differences 
outwardly while decreasing them internally manifests itself in the EU’s foreign policy. I also show 
how Europeans themselves at the mass level are contrasting the EU with stereotypical 
understanding of the United States. 
5.1. Foreign and citizenship policies in the EU 
The process of constructing differences and similarities is often described by reference to the 
concepts of “self and other”  (Neumann 1996). Constructing an image of a collective self reinforces 
in-group similarities. At the same time external differences are highlighted through processes of 
“othering”, that is, constituting non-members as others.  
 
The ideas inherent in self-categorization theory have been applied widely in IR-scholarship. For 
instance Weller (1997) applies the meta-contrast principle to analyse how perceptions of 
international relations during the cold war gave rise to a collective identity shared by Europeans and 
Americans. International relations are well suited to study processes of identity formation because 
foreign and defence policy at its core has to do with distinguishing oneself from others or to claim a 
special purpose (Risse and Grabowsky 2008). Following the meta-contrast principle we should 
therefore expect the EU’s foreign policy to have a substantial influence of the level of salience of a 
European identity.  
 
Foreign policy can increase the salience of a social identity by increasing the comparative and 
normative fit between the identity and current configurations in international relations.  As already 
described this often involves images of “Self and Other” through which intra group differences are 
downgraded and inter-group differences accentuated. In discussions of the EU’s role in 
international relations the distinction between “civilian and military powers” (ibid.) is often evoked 
as an explicit image of self and other. The notion of the EU as a “civilian power” can be seen as an 
attempt to differentiate Europe from other military powers in international relations. A civilian 
power is characterized by having the following preferences of means and goals in its foreign policy: 
 
 “Security arrangement to constrain the use of force through cooperation; integration 
up to partial supranationalism; democracy and human rights promotion; non-violence in conflicts; 
social equity and sustainable development; interdependence and the division of labor; cosmopolitan 
international law” (ibid.). 
 
The biggest challenge for the EU in terms of creating an image of self and other is the difficulty of 
constructing an image that is distinctively European. For instance it is beyond doubt that the foreign 
policy of the United States also builds upon a strong adherence to the protection and promotion of 
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democracy and human rights. Agreeing that is has been the United States rather than the EU 
promoting and exporting democratic values since World War II Risse and Grabowsky (2008) do 
however find place for a particular European role in international relations: 
 
 “Europe has developed a specific European version of these values stressing social 
and economic rights as well as the welfare state categorically opposing the death penalty” (ibid: 
10). 
 
This suggests that the normative fit of a particular European – and not just “Western”- identity in 
international relations could increase to the extent distinctions are drawn between Europe and the 
United States.  Caporaso and Kim (2009) argue that in fact there is a growing sense that “Europe 
considers the US to be different on economic, ideological, and political grounds”. They highlight a 
number of concrete examples illustrating the differences. In addition to the question of capital 
punishment: 
 
 “Ideological opposition across the Atlantic has occurred with regard to the 
International Criminal Court (…), the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol 
on global warming, and, most recently, the Iraq War” (ibid: 29). 
 
Especially the Iraq war is an interesting case. The US lead intervention showed signs of increasing 
the situational relevance of a European social identity. Two points are worth highlighting. First, 
discussions leading up to the war showed that differences in opinion about the use of military force 
were much smaller between Europeans internally than between Europeans and Americans. (Risse 
and Grabowski 2008: 11) Second, “hundreds of thousands of Europeans gathered in huge anti-war 
demonstrations – demonstrations for their values and in some instances against the US” (ibid.).  In 
such situations were citizens across Europe take to the streets in strong opposition to the Iraq war 
the comparative fit of a European identity could increase as the differences among Europeans are 
downplayed while the differences between EU and the US are highlighted. At this point it should of 
course be noted that Europe did not stand in common opposition to the US during the Iraq war. In 
fact a significant number of EU member states including Denmark, the UK and Spain were part of 
the coalition forces in 2003. Nevertheless, the Iraq war in many ways represented a kind of 
“window of opportunity” in terms of forging a European identity by highlighting apparent 
commonalities among Europeans – partly in opposition to the US. In fact, the empirical record 
seems to suggest that the notion of the United States as being the EU’s “Other” has taken root 
among European citizens. Survey data from the period 2003-2006 show that Europeans consistently 
rate the United States negatively in comparison with Europe. This finding is based on responses to 
the following Eurobarometer question: “In your opinion would you say that the United States (or 
the European Union) tends to play a positive role, a negative role, or neither a positive nor negative 
role regarding…?” Table 1 below shows the share of EU citizens that think respectively the EU and 
the United States play a positive role in five policy areas. 
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Table 1: Share of Europeans believing the US and the EU play a positive role i  
 
The US (the EU) in % Fall 2003 Fall 2004 Spring 2005 Fall 2005 Fall 2006 
Peace in the World 
 27 (60) 22 (61) 25 (63) 24 (63) 23 (60) 
The protection of the 
environment 14 (46) 17 (58) 18 (62) 17 (61) 18 (60) 
The fight against global 
terrorism 43 (54) 39 (59) 43 (60) 38 (61) 37 (59) 
The growth of world 
economy 34 (40) 35 (49) 38 (50) 37 (49) 38 (53) 
The fight against poverty in 
the world 17 (36) 18 (45) 20 (49) 20 (49) 21 (49) 
 
Source: Caporaso and Kim (2009: 29) – Eurobarometer 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 and 66 
 
 
A number of findings from table 1 are worth highlighting. First, the table indicates a significant 
difference in terms of how the EU and the US are perceived among Europeans. Throughout the 
entire period Europeans consistently believe that the European Union plays a more positive role 
than the United States within all the five policy areas. Second, the perceived differences between 
the EU and the US have gotten bigger during the period from 2003-2006. Positive perceptions of 
the US have decreased while positive perceptions of the EU have increased. The share of Europeans 
that believe the US plays a positive role with regards to “Peace in the World” and “The fight against 
terrorism” has dropped more or less consistently from 2003-2006. This is an interesting finding 
given the foreign policy context. As noted above, the debate over the Iraq War beginning in 2003 
highlighted strong disagreements between the US and Europe with countries like Germany and 
France strongly opposing the invasion. The fact that a decreasing share of Europeans view the US’s 
role as positive in these policy areas could indicate that European recognize and appreciate the 
foreign policy distinctions between the US and Europe. While perceptions of the US have worsened 
Europeans’ view of the EU seem to have improved in the same period. In all the five policy areas 
except for “Peace in the World” the share of Europeans believing that the EU plays a positive role 
has increased rather significantly.  
 
As the above indicates there is some evidence that the EU is positioning itself as a distinctive actor 
in international relations. This is highlighted by a construction of self and other rooted in the 
dichotomy between “civilian” and “military” power. More specifically research and available data 
suggests that the United States to a still larger degree is portrayed as the EU’s “other” both at the 
elite and mass level. Referring to the meta-contrast principle an increase in the perceived 
differences between the US and Europe could increase the situational relevance of a European 
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identity. 
 
Another circumstance, which some might expect to enhance the situational relevance of a European 
identity is the introduction of EU citizens. Most would agree that our national identity gains 
situational relevance when we are confronted with the question: “Where are you from?” On the 
same token few would argue that debates on immigration policy have a tendency to evoke strong 
national (or maybe even nationalistic) feelings.  The central theme in both these cases is citizenship. 
Where you are from or who should be permitted to immigrate tends to come down to the question 
of citizenship. Therefore it is fair to assume a connection between citizenship and the situational 
relevance of a national identity. 
 
Expanding this to the European level one would assume that the European identity gains situational 
relevance in response to the introduction and development of the EU citizenship. Historically the 
formation of the modern nation state relied heavily on the granting of citizenship status to the 
members of the state. This has to do with the fact that collective identity formation, as already 
indicated, is based upon demarcations between in-group and out-group, which are formed by setting 
up clear boundaries. In this regard the granting of citizenship plays an important role since it 
“always defines those who are, and who are not, members of a common society” (Lehning 1999: 5). 
While citizenship primarily functions as a legal status outlining particular rights and duties for those 
in possession of it, a citizenship therefore also articulates a shared identity understood as an 
expression of one’s membership in a political community (ibid.).  
 
The development of rights allotted to European citizens began with the free movement provisions 
of the Treaty of Paris long before the formal introduction of EU citizenship (Laffan 1996: 96). The 
treaty, signed in 1951, which established the European Coal and Steel Community, included a right 
for workers to move freely in these industries. The subsequent Treaty of Rome (1957) extended the 
principle of free movement to include all workers within the European Economic Commmunity 
(EEC). According to Brigid Laffan EU institutions have played a key role in expanding and 
broadening rights for European citizens: 
 
“The development of individual rights (…) was gradually expanded by proactive policies on the 
part of the Commission and landmark judgements of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ 
expanded the interpretation of ‘workers’ and established the framework of individual rights” 
(Laffan 1996: 96-97).  
 
The framework of individual rights was formally consolidated with the introduction of EU 
citizenship, which also, as noted by Laffan, begins the process of “redefining the boundaries of 
political community in Europe” (ibid.). EU citizenship was formally introduced with the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1993, which states that anyone holding the nationality of any EU member state 
automatically also holds EU citizenship. With the subsequent Amsterdam Treaty from 1999 it was 
explicitly established that EU citizenship supplements rather than replaces national citizenship. The 
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EU-citizenship entails a number of core rights including the right to move and reside freely within 
the EU and the right to vote for and stands as candidate in European Parliament and municipal 
elections. In terms of identity formation at the European level it contributes to outlining the 
constitutive norms of the European collective identity. In part, by defining the membership criteria 
for the community (member state nationality), and in part by outlining the practices (rights, 
obligations and duties) that categorize Europeans and distinguish them from other collectives. With 
regards to the latter point, EU-citizenship has been criticised for representing a “thin” conception of 
citizenship based on securing particular rights rather than outlining the obligations and duties 
bestowed upon citizens of the European Union. Various critics have argued that without a “thick” 
conception of citizenship incorporation republican ideals of participation or a communitarian notion 
of citizen obligations, it is unlikely that EU citizenship well be capable of altering citizens’ 
identification with Europe and thereby fostering a collective European identity. One could also 
argue that the main reason why the EU citizenship has not enhanced collective identity formation 
relates to the meta-contrast principle. Since the legal obtainment of EU-citizenship depends on 
national citizenship status the fit between a European identity and EU-citizenship is largely missing.  
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6. European identity commitment 
EU’s perceived role in international relations as well as the continual constructions of the US as an 
“other” could affect the situational relevance of a European identity. With this in place I now turn 
towards the question of “commitment” (Anderson 2010). If two or more social identities have 
situational relevance the identity towards which an individuals is most “committed” will be 
activated. For instance, the current crisis in Ukraine to some extent has reiterated a cold war divide 
between “East” and “West”. In turn, a category as “Westerner” (rooted in the NATO-alliance) as 
well as a “European” category (rooted in the EU) might gain situational relevance. Self-
categorization theory would then have it that the European identity becomes salient if an individual 
is more committed to it than he or she is towards the NATO alliance. On the same note, if an 
individual is equally committed to two social identities then the one with most situational relevance 
will become salient (ibid: 48). Commitment is a key concept in self-categorization theory and 
important if we are to understand how a European collective emerges. Following the theoretical 
premises we should assume a European collective identity to emerge to the extent individuals are 
strongly committed towards a European social identity. 
 
The question is then of course what determines whether or not and to what extent an individual is 
committed towards a social identity? According to Anderson (2010) empirical studies have shown 
that individuals are committed towards a particular social identity to the extent they have “clarity 
over group membership” (Anderson 2010: 49). When an individual has a large degree of clarity 
over group membership he or she values being a member and is aware of the basis tenets of the 
group. Having a strong “clarity of group membership” increases the likelihood of activating a social 
identity because individuals become “aware of belonging to a certain group” (ibid: 49). “Clarity of 
membership” and thus a sense of commitment can be stimulated in two ways.  
 
On the one hand the construction of symbols or narratives about the group is expected to increase 
commitment by accentuating a “subjective feeling of belonging” (ibid.) Such symbols or narratives 
will often be elite-constructions emanating from the top-down thereby closely resembling what I 
have previously referred to as “culturalist identity formation” (Recchi 2014).  
 
On the other hand increased cooperation and interaction between group members will also increase 
the level of commitment towards a social identity (Anderson 2010: 49). This process closely 
resembles that of “structuralist identity formation” (Recchi 2014). The in-group interaction can 
develop either as a means to a particular end or as an end-goal (Anderson 2010: 49). In the latter 
case interaction and cooperation between group members is seen as having intrinsic value, while in 
the former case interaction and cooperation has an instrumental nature seen as a resource towards 
achieving particular goals. Commitment towards a social identity is expected to be stronger in cases 
were the interaction and cooperation among group-members has intrinsic value than in cases where 
is has mostly instrumental value. According to Anderson (2010) cooperation has an intrinsic value 
when members of a group cooperate and interact with each, not because it benefits each of them 
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materially, but because they share a collective identity. In such cases the cooperation needs no 
legitimization.  
 
While the proposition that commitment is expected to be stronger when the cooperation is based on 
a shared identity seems plausible, I would argue that is has some logical fallacies - at least if it were 
to be applied to this case. We are interested in whether or not an individual is committed to a social 
identity because it can help us predict when and how a social identity is activated. In turn, the 
question of whether or not a social identity is activated is important because it tells us when and 
how a collective identity emerges. Given this order of things it would make little sense to argue that 
a European social identity is activated due to increased commitment resulting from cooperation and 
interaction among individuals who believe they share an identity. That would correspond to 
claiming that a European collective identity emerges because Europeans share a collective identity. 
Such a conclusion would be a prime example of petitio principii or circular argumentation where 
the conclusion is assumed beforehand. I am interested in how a collective identity emerges and 
therefore I limit myself to investigating what we might refer to as teleological cooperation and 
interaction. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I look at how the emergence of various symbols of 
European integration affects the salience of a European social identity. Given the framework 
outlined above we should expect these symbols to increase the salience of the social identity 
because they increase the level of commitment individuals feel towards their European social 
identity. Second, I trace processes of interaction and cooperation between Europeans and the 
identity altering affects it might have. Two instances of cooperation and interaction are highlighted 
 
• Cooperation in the representative and supranational institutions of the EU 
• Physical and non-physical interaction among Europeans in the public sphere and through 
various types of cross-border practices. 
6.1. The politics of belonging 
Laffan  (1996) argues that the use of symbols and myths play an important role in generating a 
European identity. Often referred to as “identity politics” (Fossum 2001), symbols, myths and 
storytelling, being pivotal in the formation of the modern nation state, have emanated from Brussels 
throughout the history of European integration. Notable examples include: the Flag of Europe 
representing both the European Union and the Council of Europe; the European anthem based on 
Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy”, which in 1985 was adopted as the official hymn for the European Union; 
the “Europe Day” held annually on May 9 to mark the anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, 
which is considered to be the founding moment of the EU.  
 
While it is very difficult to prove a direct causal link between on the one side an individual’s 
exposure to symbols and myths of Europe and the other side his or her attachment towards a 
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European social identity, attempts have been made by different scholars to assess the 
“effectiveness” (Recchi 2014) of what we might refer to as EU’s identity strategies. Applying 
statistical analysis Bruter (2003) finds “that being consistently exposed to symbols of European 
integration does, indeed, reinforce a citizen’s sense of identification with Europe” (Bruter 2003: 
1166). This supports the notion that exposure to symbols increases the salience of a European social 
identity. 
 
A number of scholars have also argued that the Euro represents a strong symbol of European 
integration.   The introduction of a common European currency, the Euro, in 2002 served not only 
economic and financial purposes, but also to solidify European identity (Malyarov and Hendrick 
2003:15). Throughout history national identities and national currencies have been closely linked 
together. A national currency highlights not only the economic, but also the socio-cultural 
differences between nations since the notes and coins tend to have a symbolic nature as they often 
portray “national heroes, past leaders, national flags or monuments” (ibid.). Collective identity 
formation is dependent upon individuals identifying with the collective, which in turn relies on the 
degree to which the collective becomes salient in the lives of individuals. The everyday use of a 
common European currency is a direct and straightforward practice raising the awareness of 
European integration as a tangible process and Europe as a perceptible community. As Malyarov 
and Hendrick (2003) phrase it:  
 
“Daily usage of the euro provides a constant reminder to the twelve states currently using the Euro 
that they are bound together not only by treaty, but by the very coins and notes in their pockets 
(ibid: 17).  
 
Data from Eurobarometer surveys seems to question the proposition that the common currency is 
solidifying a collective European identity. The latest survey on the topic from 2013 (Eurobarometer 
386) shows that only around a quarter of all citizens in the Euro area (24%) find that the euro makes 
them feel more European, while 74% say that the euro has no impact whatsoever in terms of 
making them feel more European. Although Europeans on average don’t find the euro to increase 
their degree of identification with Europe, it would be premature to dismiss altogether the impact 
the euro has on the formation of a European identity. In a Eurobarometer survey from 2013 
respondents were asked what the EU personally meant to them and provided a long list of possible 
answers. Across the entire EU 32% responded that for them the EU personally amounted to the 
existence of the euro and looking isolated at the Euro-zone the equivalent share was 40%. Only the 
right to move and reside freely within the Union was seen by a larger share of people as being their 
personal conception of the EU. This indicates that while people, when asked, do not feel more 
European due to the euro, the common currency does seem to have a significant impact on the 
content of the European Union as an identity category. 
 
Aggregated data collected from across the entire Eurozone provides a good overall indicator of the 
Euro’s identity-shaping effects, but ignores potentially significant country specific variations. 
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Sensitive to potential differences within the Eurozone Risse (2003) studies, which consequences on 
popular identification with Europe the introduction of the common currency has had in Italy and 
Germany. His research shows that Italians are more inclined to feel that the Euro makes them feel 
more European than the Eurozone-average although the share indicating is still rather modest 
(around one in three). Meanwhile the share of Germans feeling equally affective towards the Euro 
is considerably smaller than the Eurozone-average with no less than 89% considering the 
introduction of the Euro “irrelevant for their European identity” (Risse 2003: 494). In sum, 
therefore it seems fair to conclude that as its most significant effect the Euro has not strengthened 
identification with Europe, but rather taken the place as a “symbolic representation” of the EU in 
the minds of European citizens. 
6.2. Increased identity commitment through cooperation in the EU-institutions 
As mentioned the commitment towards an identity varies in response to the type of in-group 
cooperation that is developing. If cooperation and interaction is seen as an end in itself the 
commitment is stronger than if individuals interact only with the purpose of achieving certain goals. 
I believe that the institutions of the European Union are very well suited to study the latter type of 
instrumental cooperation. 
 
Within European identity research there is a rich literature exploring the “socializing” effects of the 
European institutions (e.g. Checkel 2005; Hermann et al 2004; Risse 2004). Based on a social 
constructivist tradition the research investigates the “constitutive effects” the institutions have on 
the identity of actors engaged with them on a regular basis. Both the representative and the 
supranational institutions of the EU have been the object of this research. Given the goal-oriented 
nature of the cooperation in the EU-institutions it seems unlikely that they should generate strong 
commitment. As a result we should not expect to see strong attachment towards a European social 
identity among officials engaged in these institutions.  
 
Laffan (2004) however finds evidence of the contrary. Based on her study of the socializing effects 
of EU’s supranational institutions - the European Court of Justice, the Commission and the 
European Central Bank - she even categorizes the EU as an “identity builder”. According to Laffan 
the supranational institutions, in contrast to the Union’s representative institutions including the 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers, promote European identification because officials in these 
institutions tend to adopt a European perspective based on supranational rather than national norms 
(Laffan 2004: 86-87). These findings fit comfortably with a constructivist approach to identity 
formation according to which institutions have constitutive effects on actor’s identity due to the fact 
that actors, in an attempt to perform their tasks, adapt to the formal and informal rules of the 
institution through a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2006). The potential “identity-
building” capacity, Laffan writes, is largest within the Commission as it exerts upon officials the 
institutions role as “guardians of the treaty” (ibid.). Reflecting upon the findings from Laffan’s 
study Risse (2004a) argues that with regards to officials in the supranational EU institutions “we 
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expect them to develop a stronger sense of group identity with the EU than those who have less 
direct experiences with its institutions” (Risse 2004a: 21).  
 
While socialization seems to take place – at least to some degree – in the Commission I believe it 
would be premature to conclude that the attachment towards a European social identity is increased 
through such interaction among officials. The high salience of a European social identity among 
officials in the Commission might be caused by institutional socialization, but at the same time it 
not unlikely that such sentiments are widespread among young professionals in the particular cohort 
from which “Eurocrats” are typically drawn. In other words, the strong pro-European attitudes 
detected by Laffan (2004) might have been equally apparent among those particular individuals had 
they not worked in the Commission.  
 
Such skepticism about the “identity-enhancing” effects of the EU’s supranational institutions seem 
warranted when looking at another study of the EU-commission by Hoeghe (2005). Based on 
surveys conducted among senior officials in the Commission Hoeghe finds that top-officials are 
significantly more supportive of and attached to Europe than the general public (Hoeghe 2005: 873-
874). Illustrative of the significant differences between officials and the public the study reports that 
while 42 % of the public feel “National only” when asked to characterize their identity, non among 
the Commissions senior officials identify solely with their nation. On the same note, around 45% of 
senior officials report feeling more European than national compared to less than 10 % among the 
public (ibid: 874). When analysing the independent background variables influencing this 
astonishingly high level of European identification Hoeghe comes up with some interesting results 
that differ to some degree from Laffan’s. According to Hoeghe the overall socialization effect is 
modest and non-significant (ibid: 875). Instead she attributes a large share of the pro-European 
sentiment to factors external from the commission including country of origin and ideology.  
 
While there is no strong evidence of cooperation in the EU-commission increasing identity 
commitment, we should expect a representative institution like the Council of Ministers to be even 
less “effective” in terms of generating commitment. Not only is the institution characterized by 
intergovernmental bargaining, which is an example of instrumental cooperation. Furthermore, and 
in contrast with the situation in EU-commission, we should not expect politicians and officials in 
the Council be EU-supportive beforehand.  
 
A study by Beyers (2005) investigates the degree of socialization in the Council of Ministers and its 
working groups, which is an interesting case all the while officials are expected to experience cross-
pressure from supranational roles and norms on the one side and domestic interests and 
expectations on the other. The study finds that the working processes in the Council of Ministers is 
characterized not only by intergovernmental bargaining based on domestic member state interests, 
but also a common interests in joint problem solving. As Beyers writes; 
 
“State representatives adopt supranational role conceptions as norms (…), puzzle over joint and 
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deliberative problem solving (…) and try to learn about problems in other member states” (Beyers 
2005: 933).  
 
The findings from Beyers study are echoed in another study of the socializing effects within the 
Council of Ministers (Laffan 2004). This study concluded; 
 
“National officials and politicians whose job it is to promote and protect national preferences are 
socialised into collective norms through the intensity of negotiations and the search for collective 
agreement” (Laffan 2004: 96). 
 
While both studies indicate that officials and politicians in the Council actually do take on 
supranational roles and norms, the important question to ask is whether this amounts to an actual 
increase of the commitment towards a European identity. Helpful in this regard is the distinction 
between what Checkel (2005) refers to as Type-1 and Type-2 socialization. While the latter is the 
kind of socialization we are interested in here, the former refers to situations in which actors take on 
institutional norms in an instrumental and calculating manner. Officials driven by domestic interests 
engage in a kind of “role-playing” taking on supranational norms and roles knowing that it 
increases changes of satisfying domestic political interests. Aware of the important distinction 
between Type-1 and Type-2 socialization Beyers (2005) explicitly addresses the question arguing 
that Type-1 socialization to some extent is a fitting description, especially in those cases where 
officials and politicians operate under strong domestic constrains.  
 
By and large the research by Laffan (2004), Hoeghe (2005) and Beyers (2005) seem to confirm the 
proposition that cooperation and interaction legitimized as a means to and end does little to increase 
the commitment towards a European identity. Such preliminary conclusions draw a dim picture for 
the potential for identity commitment at the European level.  
 
However, there might be another side to the story. As already mentioned social identities are more 
likely to be activated in response to interaction than in response to instrumental cooperation. I 
would argue that the differences between cooperation and interaction are highlighted in the theory 
of transactionalism, introduced by one of the founding fathers of integration theory, Karl Deutsch 
(1912- 1992). If anything I believe that the core theme within transactionalism is the question of 
how economic and political cooperation (cooperation) gives rise to social interactions between 
individuals, which in turn gives rise to a “sense of community” (i.e. a collective identity). 
6.3. Increased identity commitment through cross-border interaction     
Deutsch’s transactionalism is a theory of political integration. According to the theory the key 
component in relation to political integration is the development of a transnational “sense of 
community” (Deutsch et al 1957: 68). Deutsch, whose use of the concept relates to the formation of 
“amalgamated security communities”, offers a description of this “sense of community”, which is 
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very much in line with the present-day articulations of European identity formation: 
 
“The kind of sense of community that is relevant for (European) integration, and therefore for our 
study, turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we-feeling”, trust, and 
mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually 
successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in accordance with it – in short, a 
matter of perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and 
responsiveness in the process of decision-making” (Deutsch et al 1957: 76). 
 
Although Deutsch himself did not study identity formation explicitly his “sense of community” is a 
proxy of collective identity. As a result the literature on European identity formation entails 
numerous studies explicitly taking a “Deutschian” approach (e.g. Favell et al 2011; Scheuer and 
Schmitt 2009). According to Deutsch a “sense of community” emerges in response to increased 
interaction and cooperation within a bounded territory. Favell et al (2011) sum up the community 
formation process in the following way: 
 
 “For Deutsch greater economic and political cooperation between states would 
facilitate multiple and growing cross-border social transactions – i.e., personal interactions and 
movements – at the individual level, which in turn would establish a sense of community – i.e., the 
emergence of a regional identity – and legitimate further integration” (Favell et al 2011: 32).  
 
 
The citation implies an interesting relation between transactionalism and Anderson’s model of 
increasing commitment. While Anderson distinguishes between instrumental cooperation and 
intrinsic interaction, Deutsch connects the two in a kind of circular logic. Instrumental cooperation 
between individuals gives rise to a collective identity, which then in turn facilitates further intrinsic 
interaction understood as cooperation based on the notion that the actors involved share an identity.  
 
Applying vocabulary from self-categorization theory transactionalism suggests that a European 
social identity is likely to become salient in response to Europeans growing more committed to that 
social identity through an increase in instrumental cooperation and interaction across borders.  
 
However, to be more precise Deutsch is not implying direct causality between economic and 
political cooperation and increased identity commitment. There is an intermediate level between the 
two and this is perhaps the cornerstone in the theory of transactionalism. Thus, instrumental 
cooperation facilitates a growing level of cross-border social interaction and it is as a result of these 
types of interaction a social European identity is activated. Deutsch identifies a number of particular 
types of social interaction that are decisive in terms of forging a “sense of community”. I would like 
to highlight two.  
 
First, Deutsch stresses the importance of “unbroken links of social communication” between the 
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different actors in the subunits that are to form a community. More precisely he refers to “social 
groups and institutions, which provide effective channels of communication, both horizontally 
among the main units (…) and vertically among the politically relevant strata within them” 
(Deutsch et al 1957: 82). As a second condition Deutsch highlighted the importance of what he 
refers to as “mobility of persons” (ibid.). Deutsch, originally a scholar of nationalism, knew that 
nation-building involved increased levels of social interaction within a bounded territory and 
therefore expected transnational community formation to depend heavily on the degree of cross-
border mobility among actors (Recchi 2014: 5-6).  
 
In the following I trace these types of social interactions within the European Union arguing that 
there is evidence suggesting that they do in fact seem to raise the salience of a social European 
identity.  
 
Identity activation in a European public sphere 
 
According to Deutsch community formation requires and emerges from “unbroken links of 
communication” providing effective channels of horizontal communication among actors in the 
community. This requirement addresses the common notion that a European identity is produced 
and reproduced in a European public sphere where “we discuss matters of concern to us as 
“Europeans” and not as “Danes, Germans and Italians”. Our clarity of belonging to a European 
community (and not just a national) and thus our commitment towards a European identity is 
expected to increase as we engage in a European public sphere. The link between a well-
functioning public sphere on the one hand and an emerging European collective identity on the 
other hand is outlined by Kaina & Karolewski (2013): 
 
“Public space promotes collective identity by anchoring citizens in a community. However, 
belonging to a community does not have to be underpinned by pre-political bonds, since the public 
sphere is capable of generating collective identity through participation, communicative opinion 
formation and autonomous lawmaking” (Kaina & Karolewski 2013: 10). 
 
Public spheres pave the way for the formation of a reflexive collective identity by supplying a 
communicative arena in which shared understandings of commonality and distinctiveness emerge. 
Keeping in mind the premises of transactionalism the important question then is whether or not 
there is in fact a European public sphere within which a European social identity is activated.  
 
To answer that question we need to know what to look for. In other words, we need to know what a 
public sphere relates to in general terms and more precisely we need to know where and how to 
look for a European public sphere. In broad terms a public sphere is often understood as “a space or 
arena for (broad public) deliberation, discussion, and engagement in societal issues” (De Vreese 
2007: 5). Much of the research on the European public sphere departs from the work of Jürgen 
Habermas and most notably “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” (1962). 
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According to Habermas a public sphere “is an arena for the perception, identification, and treatment 
of problems affecting the whole society” (Habermas 1962 quoted in De Vreese 2007: 5). Habermas 
is aware of the important link between a public sphere and collective identity formation. This is 
illustrated by his argument that the former is where “discourses aimed at achieving self-
understanding can be conducted, and collective identities and need interpretations can be 
circulated” (ibid.).  
 
Although a public sphere in theory can manifest itself through a large number of different concrete 
platforms, the media and its content often work as a proxy for the public sphere since news media 
today stands out as the most important arena “in which political actors, civil society and even 
citizens can express views and make announcements” (ibid.). In the context of identity formation 
the media then can be thought of as a sort of platform on which members of a group contest and 
debate collective self-understandings in turn raising the salience of a European social identity. The 
public sphere should of course not be entirely equated with media, and several scholars have also 
studied the emergence of a public sphere by looking at other arenas for deliberation including the 
European Parliament and the European conventions. However, in the context of European 
collective identity formation I find that the media better represents the features of the public sphere 
important for identity formation in that it reaches a wider segment of Europeans and gives voice, 
not only to policymakers and other elites, but also to regular European citizens. 
 
Does a European public sphere as the one I have just outlined exist? Conventional wisdom holds 
that there is no European public sphere because there is no “community of communication on the 
European level based on a common language and genuinely European media” (Maier & Risse 
2003: 56). In this view a public sphere at the European level must take an entirely new form since it 
is expected to form above the various national public spheres. In other words, by nature newspapers 
like “The Guardian”, “El Pais” and “Die Welt” cannot belong to the same European public sphere. 
However, a number of scholars have challenged this pessimistic account of the potential for a 
European public sphere proposing different – and perhaps more realistic – criteria.  
 
Eder and Kantner argue that a European public sphere can be said to exist when media across 
Europe communicate “the same issues at the same time using the same criteria of relevance” (Maier 
& Risse 2003: 58). Meanwhile, and on the same not, Maier & Risse (2003) find that a European 
public sphere “emerges out of the interconnection of and mutual exchanges between various 
national public spheres (ibid.). As these findings suggest a transnational European public sphere is 
not necessarily dependent upon the abolishment of national media since they are actually capable of 
meeting the basic requirements noted above. In continuation hereof, a number of measurement 
indicators have been developed.  
 
First, as proposed by Maier & Risse (2003), the formation of a European Public Sphere would 
entail a high degree of attention to European themes in the national media. Second, and following 
the definition from Eder and Kantner, it would require “similar frames of reference with regards to 
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European affairs” (ibid.). This second indicator suggests that in a European public sphere important 
political, social and economic themes are reported from a “universal” European perspective rather 
than a “particularistic” national perspective. For instance, reports of the debt crisis in Southern 
Europe are not framed as a problem caused by lazy Greeks or Italians in some national public 
spheres and as a result of Germany’s strict and unfair austerity policy in others. A third indicator of 
a European public sphere following the two others is to look the degree to which Europeans are 
well informed about common European affairs. 
 
If we begin with the first of the indicators outlined above, the European Commission provides 
helpful data throught the bi-annual Eurobarometer survey. In Eurobarometer 68 (2008) QCI asks: 
“Generally speaking, do you think that the (nationality) media talks to much, about the right amount 
or too little about the European Union?” The aggregated responses across Europe are reported in 
Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Media reporting on the European Union 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 68 (2008): Public Opinion in the European Union 
 
Table 1 shows how European citizens perceive of the media coverage of the European Union on 
different media platforms (Internet, Radio, Television and Press). Disregarding the category “Press” 
around a third of all respondent believe that national media reporting on European affairs is at a 
proper level (Internet: 30%; Radio: 35%; Television: 39%). In all categories only a minority – 
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ranging from a share of 4 – 7 % - believe that there is “too much” reporting on Europe. It is worth 
noticing that close to half of all respondents believe that radio and television coverage on European 
topics is “too little” (respectively 46 and 48%).  
Maier & Risse (2003) have also analyzed the degree to which national media pay attention to 
European topics. Measuring this indicator they report the findings of a number of scholars who 
have counted how often and under what circumstances “Europe”, “European Institutions”, or 
“European affairs” are mentioned in the media” (Maier & Risse 2003: 55). The conclusions drawn 
by these scholars have been twofold. First, their quantitative assessments have shown that European 
topics, in comparison with local, regional or national topics, receive relatively scarce attention in 
turn triggering a situation where European question have low salience. Second, they have shown 
how “Europe” most often is mentioned in the media in relation to “reporting on monetary questions, 
agricultural, and, of course, on issues of European integration itself” (ibid.). Based on these 
findings, the conclusion has been that no meaningful public sphere exists (yet) at the European 
level. 
 
The second of the three indicators outlined above provides a more optimistic account by looking at 
the quality rather than the quantity of reporting on Europe. Focusing on the degree to which similar 
frames of reference are being applied across Europe’s different national media, scholars have 
concluded that rather than the emergence of a pan-European public sphere we are witnessing the 
Europeanization of national public spheres (Kaina & Karolewski 2013:12). This Europeanization 
process creates  “community of communication” in that common European topics are debated at the 
same time receiving comparable levels of attention and with the use of similar patterns of 
interpretation (ibid.). Especially important is the use of similar frames. This suggests that 
deliberation and dialogue on European topics is conducted “irrespective of national background 
(Maier & Risse 2003: 55).  In addition to the Europeanization of national media Risse also 
identifies what he categorizes as a “transnationalization” of the national public spheres. This 
process manifests itself through cross border debates in which problems are identified as European, 
and where actors from different nations are recognized as equal participants (Kaina & Karolewski 
2013: 12).  
 
The second indicator and the work conducted by Thomas Risse gives rise to a positive assessment 
of the European public sphere and the move towards a collective identity. However, it should be 
noted that much on the work of the Europeanization and transnationalization of national public 
spheres is based on data from what we might call the quality press in Europe (ibid.). In other words, 
it does not seriously engage with the Europeanization of the broad non-elitist public sphere. Some 
might even argue that the identification of transnational debates engaging actors from different EU-
member states in the columns of the Financial Times reinforces the elitist nature of European 
integration rather than pointing towards the potential for broad transnational deliberation on 
European affairs.  
 
Providing some remedy to the weakness of the second indicator, the third indicator concerns the 
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degree to which Europeans are well informed about European affairs and the European Union. 
Survey question QA19 in Eurobarometer 68 is useful in that regard. The question asks Europeans 
whether they “feel that their compatriots suffer from a significant information deficit as regards 
European political affairs”. Although this question doesn’t necessarily relate directly to the amount 
of information provided by national media it does provide us with an indication of the degree to 
which the public sphere engages not only elites, but also the general public. Table 2 illustrates the 
findings. 
 
Table 2: Information deficit among Europeans 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 68 (2008): Public Opinion in the European Union (QA19). 
 
As the diagram illustrates a vast majority believe that their compatriots are either “Not very well 
informed” (56%) or “Not at all informed” (22%), while only a minority believe that their 
compatriots are “Fairly well informed” (16%) or “Very well informed” (2%). If we assume that the 
respondents are correct in their assessment of the information level of their fellow Europeans then 
these findings present a significant obstacle for the activation of a European social identity among 
ordinary European citizens. 
 
 
If  – as proposed by Deutsch - the presence of “effective channels of communication” is a necessary 
precondition for individual activating a social European identity then there seems to be reason for 
concern. Despite signs of “transnationalization” and “Europeanisation” in certain (elitist) media 
outlets close to 50% of ordinary Europeans believe that the national media (radio and television) 
report “too little” on European affairs. Meanwhile only 18% of Europeans believe that their 
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compatriots are “very well” or “fairly well” informed about European political affairs compared to 
a share of 78% who find that their compatriots are either “not at all” or “not very well informed”. 
Such finding can be explained by reference to studies showing that national media pay very little 
attention to European topics compared to local, regional or national topics. The absence of a 
meaningful European public sphere and the information deficit it produces provides a poor 
framework for collective identity formation in Europe. Without an arena (engaging both elites and 
citizens) for the on-going contestation and dialogue between Europeans the likelihood of citizens 
activating a social European identity decreases as we should then expect the “commitment” towards 
or “relative accessibility” of that identity to be modest. 
 
Increased identity salience through cross-border mobility 
The second of Deutsch’s two types of social interaction expected to increase identification with 
Europe is a high degree of mobility among individuals in a community. A number of scholars have 
analyzed the extent and nature of cross-border mobility in Europe and its relation to processes of 
identity formation. Research on the intersection between mobility and identification tends to 
highlight two instances of cross-border mobility in Europe: (i) work related mobility and (ii) 
educational student exchange. 
 
One of the most apparent examples of cross-border mobility has to do with people who choose to 
resettle to another country within Europe. A large number of scholars have looked into the question 
of cross-border mobility in Europe and at large their findings have confirmed Deutsch’s original 
idea (Favell et al 2011). Although the motives behind decisions to relocate as well as the strategies 
for integration vary a great deal, there is a clear and positive correlation between cross-border 
movement and European identification. Favell et al (2011) specify the connection: 
 
“The subjective correlates of cross-border movements are clear: EU movers have an acute sense of 
being European, as they identify more strongly with ‘Europe’ and have by far a more positive 
image of and better knowledge of the European Union than the rest of the population” (Favell et al 
2011: 20). 
 
Since the Treaty of Rome cross border mobility has been recognized as a key component of 
European integration. Initially it was first and foremost viewed as a “functional prerequisite for the 
common market” (Recchi & Nebe 2003: 19) and promoted in 1968 when the free movement of 
workers was established as the first of the four basic economic freedoms in what was then the 
“European Common Market”. At the core of this principle was the abolishment of restrictions on 
movement and residence for workers and their families within the European Community 
(Eurofound 2011). However, since its early days the European Community has held the official 
position that mobility of persons not only underpins the Common Market but also “encourages the 
sharing of cultures and promotes the concept of European citizenship as well as that of a political 
Europe” (‘EU’s Action Plan for Mobility’ quoted in Recchi and Nebe 2003: 7). In other words, an 
increase in cross-border practices and interactions among Europeans it set to intensify the affective 
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dimension of European integration raising the salience of a social European identity. Therefore the 
principle of freedom of movement within Europa has been of an inclusive nature and today 
encompasses not only those seeking employment in other member states, but also citizens seeking 
simply to reside or enjoy retirement abroad. In short the European Union has been successful in 
removing internal border controls, thereby enabling Europeans to move freely between member 
states.  
 
The question then is whether Europeans capitalize on these institutionally provided opportunities by 
familiarizing with each other across borders in turning laying the foundation for an emerging 
Deutschian “sense of community”? The degree of cross-border mobility can be examined in a 
number of ways. One important and often applied indicator is the work-related mobility across 
Europe. Eurobarometer survey 337 from 2010 (“Geographical and Labour Market Mobility”) 
provides data on this indicator. QC10 sheds light of the mobility intentions among Europeans by 
asking: “Do you envisage to work in a country outside (your country) at some time in the future?” 
Table 3 below illustrates the answers. 
 
Table 3: Mobility intentions among Europeans 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 337 (2010)  
 
 
The survey has divided respondents into three categorizes with different aggregated results: The 
entire EU (EU27), the pre-2004 member states (EU15) and the 12 new members states from the 
eastern enlargement (NMS12). As table 3 shows 73% across the entire EU have no intention of 
working in another country in the future, while 17 % envision working abroad. Interested in 
understanding the reason Europeans might have to relocate the survey also asked respondents to 
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state their motivations. Perhaps not surprisingly the main reason provided by respondents in EU27 
was the possibility of earning more money (35%). Interestingly enough this was a far stronger 
motivation among citizens in the new member states where 61% reported a potential for increased 
earnings as the main motivation.  
 
As a number of migration scholars have pointed out that intentions to move are not always a 
reliable predictor of actual migration. It is therefore helpful to supplement with surveys of actual 
experiences with cross-border mobility. A Eurobarometer survey from 2005 (64.1) analysed such 
patterns of mobility and concluded that 4% of the total population in the EU had experience with 
living in another EU member state, and that Eastern Europeans were far less likely to have had such 
an experience than Western Europeans (Favell et al 2011:21).  
 
One of the most comprehensive studies of work-related migration within the European Union is the 
PIONEUR project funded under the EC 5th framework program. The project found that during the 
period from 1990 to 2000 “the percentage of foreign born residents in (all) EU countries continued 
to rise” (Recchi et al 2003: 10). Looking across all EU member states European foreigners comprise 
about one-third of the total population of non-nationals, with the remaining two-thirds originating 
from outside the European Union (ibid.) However, the last decade of the 20th century saw a 
significant increase in the share of EU foreigners in a majority of the member states with some 
states having “almost 50% more EU-immigrants in 2000 then there were in 1990” (ibid: 14).  
 
More recent data confirms the trends highlighted in the PIONEUR project. According to a Eurostat 
publication from 2012 the majority of the 33.3 million foreign citizens resident in the EU27 
originate from non-EU countries. This is a trend that is prominent in all countries with 
Luxembourg, Cyprus, Ireland and Belgium as the significant exceptions (Eurostat 31/2012). 
 
Looking specifically at the EU-foreigners in the various member states “Italians and Portuguese 
stand out as the largest communities of EU-citizens living abroad in the EU” (Recchi et al 2003), 
while Danes and Swedes are the least inclined to relocate to another EU-country. Another 
interesting finding from the PIONEUR project was the finding that internal migration across the 
European Union is closely linked to “geographical and cultural proximity”. Europeans are far more 
likely to migrate to countries that are close both in terms of geography and culture. The authors of 
the report outline this finding: 
 
“For example, in Ireland British citizens constitute 75.3% of EU foreigners, while in 
the United Kingdom the Irish are 48.1% of EU non-national. Austrians are 10% of the non-German 
EU citizens living in Germany; the French form 19% and the Dutch 15.2% of the non-national EU 
citizens living in Belgium” (Recchi et al 2003: 20). 
 
A large strand of research has also looked at the individual factors determining the likelihood of 
moving to another EU member state. Perhaps not surprisingly age and educational level are strong 
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mobility predictors (Krieger 2004: 15-30). A large-scale survey from the ten countries to accede to 
the European Union in 2004 showed that between 85% and 90% of all potential migrants were 
under the age of 40. Furthermore, the survey also showed that of all age cohorts the group (15-24) 
was the most likely to migrate (ibid: 19). With regards to educational level, the same survey 
illustrates how the majority of migrants from the new member state were well educated. Half of the 
potential migrants (47.6%) were still studying, while almost one in five (18.5%) had completed 
tertiary education. Looking isolated at work related mobility the overall picture shows that only a 
minority (4%) of Europeans had actual experience with living in another country. Those who had 
such experience mainly came from Western Europe. Furthermore, research has indicated that the 
young and well educated are more likely to engage in cross border migration. 
 
So what does this tell us about the effect cross-border mobility within Europe has in terms of raising 
the awareness of belonging to a European community? While the correlation between the two 
variables is clear the empirical data shows that the mobility patterns within Europe in most cases 
actually aren’t of a particularly European nature.  You might say that they are either too global or 
too local. The mobility is more global than European in the sense that most foreigners living in EU-
countries originate from outside the EU. Meanwhile, it is more local than European in the sense that 
the majority of EU-foreigners living in another member state have emigrated from neighbouring 
countries. In both cases it seems unlikely that such mobility increases the sense of belonging to a 
particular European community. On the contrary, Danes living in Sweden or Irishmen living in 
Britain might become increasingly aware of a being part of a Scandinavian or Anglo-Saxon 
community rather than a European.  
 
To the extent intra-European mobility takes place the data suggests that it mostly involves students 
from the “Erasmus-generation” (Favell et al 2011). This reflects the steps the EU has taken towards 
promoting exchange between educational systems in Europe. While education policy remains the 
sole responsibility of member states, the EU is heavily engaged through the funding of various 
exchange programs. Article 165 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union lays the 
foundation for the Unions educational objectives: 
 
“The Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging 
cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their 
action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching 
and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity” (TFEU, article 
165).  
 
The objectives outlined in TFEU have resulted in the development of a number of exchange 
programmes. The initial framework for these educational initiatives was the Socrates programme, 
which ran from 1994-1999 before it was replaced by the Socrates II programme in 2000. In 2006 
the programme was replaced by the Lifelong Learning Programme (LLP), which is the current 
overall framework for the European Union’s educational activities. The perhaps most well known 
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initiative under the LLP-framework is the Erasmus programme supporting transnational student 
exchange within higher education as well as cooperation between universities and colleges in 
Europe. Another educational EU-initiative aimed at promoting cross-border mobility is the 
European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS), which facilities student mobility by 
making higher education comparable between European countries.  
 
The EU’s engagement in promoting intra-European exchange indicates an understanding of the 
proposed link between cross-border mobility and European identity salience. However, while 
numerous studies show a correlation between European identity salience and cross-border mobility, 
the evidence from studies focusing specifically on the effects of student exchange is mixed. A great 
deal of research actually rejects the hypothesis that Erasmus alters students’ sense of belonging to a 
European community (Favell et al 2011: 23). Meanwhile other studies “emphasize the enduring 
transnational social capital and awareness of former Erasmus students” (ibid.). However, again it 
should be noted that a transnational awareness not necessarily corresponds to a particular European 
awareness. Through Erasmus educational exchange, students interact not only with other 
Europeans, but also with students from other parts of the world. In other words, rather than 
resembling a closed loop the European student exchange framework seems to be heavily penetrated 
by global currents. 
 
 !  
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7. Conclusion 
Collective identities take form on the basis of a very basic human need for a social identity. Helping 
us navigate and orient ourselves in a complex social environment we as humans define who we are 
by reference to social categories or groups like for instance “father”, “professor”, “conservative” or 
“Dane”. In the process of allotting ourselves a place in relation to these different categories we also 
categorize others as belonging to this or that group. This process of self-categorization creates 
borders and boundaries between groups determining who are and who are not members. When a 
group of individuals in certain situations and in agreement with each other categorize themselves as 
members of the same group, these individuals will mutually recognize each other as members of the 
same group. This in turn gives rise to a particular “we-feeling” among members of that group, 
which is what we categorize as a collective identity.  
 
As a result, studying European collective identity formation is about studying when and how 
individuals categorize themselves as Europeans that is, when the social European identity is 
“activated”. Self-categorization theory suggests and empirical data confirms that individuals have 
not only one but several social identities. In surveys the majority of Europeans already indicate 
having a social European identity along with a number of other social identities including a national 
identity. Therefore it is more interesting to ask not if there even is a European identity, but under 
what circumstances it will be “activated” in turn paving the way for the formation of a collective 
European identity.  
 
Given these theoretical premises the goal of my thesis has been to contribute to our understanding 
of the dynamics determining if, when and how a collective European identity emerges. To be more 
precise I have been interested in investigating what characterizes the social circumstances under 
which a collective European identity is likely to emerge. Based on my analysis I believe that three 
findings should be highlighted. Let me conclude this thesis by briefly outlining each of them in 
turn. 
 
A collective European identity is more likely to emerge to the extent the EU is perceived as a 
distinct entity in the global community 
 
In line with the basic premises of self-categorization theory the analysis indicates that a social 
European identity is more likely to become activated to the extent Europe is perceived as a 
community with characteristics and attributes that are distinct in comparison with those found 
outside the community.  The meta-contrast principle states that a social identity gains situational 
relevance when the in-group differences are perceived as smaller and less significant than the 
differences between the group and other groups. Following the meta-contrast principle one could 
argue that the question of European identity salience is influenced to some extent by the actions – 
real or perceived – of the European Union in international relations. Through a common foreign and 
security policy framework the normative and comparative fit of a European identity is potentially 
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enhanced as a result of Europe being articulated and positioned as a distinct entity within the global 
community. The EU’s role in international relations is often defined by reference to the distinction 
between civilian and military powers with the EU perceived as representing the former. Among 
other things a civilian power is characterized by an adherence to promoting democracy and human 
rights around the world.  
 
Given these somewhat universal characteristics some have argued that the concept of “Civilian 
Power EU” does little or nothing to increase social identity salience. First, an adherence to 
democracy and human rights overlaps significantly with the foreign policy goals of other actors in 
international relations, most notably the US. Second, most would agree that is has been the United 
States rather than the EU promoting and exporting democratic values since World War II. While 
this would imply little room for any kind of European “distinctiveness” the analysis suggest that the 
comparative fit of a European identity could increase to the extent Europe is perceived as distinct 
from the US. Two findings point in that direction. First, during the debate leading up to the 2003 
Iraq the differences in opinion regarding the use of military force were smaller within the EU than 
they were between the EU and the United States strengthening the normative and comparative fit of 
a European identity given the meta-contrast principle. Second, throughout the period from 2003-
2006 Europeans’ perception of the role of the US deteriorated, while in contrast the perception of 
the role of EU improved consistently.  An improved view of the EU should of course not be equated 
with identity activation. However, I would argue that, given the meta-contrast principle, the 
potential for a collective European identity increases to the extent differences between Europe and 
the US are more pronounced. 
 
A collective identity is more likely to emerge under circumstances characterized by 
interaction among rather than cooperation between Europeans 
 
Self-categorization theory tells us that a social identity is more likely to be activated if individuals 
are committed to the group towards which the identity is directed. Being commitment means being 
strongly aware of group membership. Such awareness increases through cooperation and interaction 
between group-members. At first this might suggest an optimistic view on the likelihood of a 
collective identity taking form among Europeans given the substantial degree of cooperation and 
intergovernmental bargaining. However, the in-group cooperation can take on of two forms with 
only one of them expected to activate a social identity. If and when the cooperation is legitimized as 
a means to an end (i.e. instrumental cooperation) the cooperation and interaction does little to 
increase identity salience. In the case of European integration, this contrasts with neo-functionalist 
logic according to which cooperation and the benefits ensuing from it lead to a “shift of loyalties”.  
 
However, the proposition does seem to have empirical merit as the analysis in this thesis indicates. 
The supranational and especially the representative institutions of the EU provide a helpful 
laboratory for studying the relationship between instrumental cooperation and social identity 
activation. By reference to research studying the “socialising” effects of the EU institutions the 
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analysis indicates that instrumental cooperation and intergovernmental bargaining does little to raise 
the salience of a European social identity among officials engaged with the institutions. Some 
studies do find evidence of socialization in the supranational institutions by pointing towards strong 
pro-European attitudes among officials. However, this does not necessarily have anything to do 
with identity activation. On the contrary, other research tells us that these pro-European attitudes 
relate to personal convictions and that the interaction occurring in the institutions does little or 
nothing to activate a European among officials. Perhaps not surprisingly the cooperation and 
interaction taking place in the representative institutions of the EU – in this case the Council of 
Ministers – show equally limited signs of activating European identities. While studies of the EU-
institutions indicate that a European collective identity is unlikely to emerge from instrumental 
cooperation other research has shown that individuals engaged in intrinsic interaction with other 
Europeans are more likely to activate a social European identity. Based on this a tentative 
conclusion is that European collective identity is more likely to emerge under circumstances 
characterized more by interaction legitimized as an end in itself than cooperation legitimized as a 
means to an end. However:  
 
Interaction only stimulates collective European identity formation to the extent it is internally 
inclusive and externally exclusive 
 
While the link between instrumental cooperation and identity activation is rejected, the self-
categorization theory establishes a strong link between identity activation on the one side and 
intrinsic interaction on the other. When group-members engage in intrinsic interaction they interact 
with each other, not as a means to an end, but because the interaction has value it itself. Such 
interaction tends to emerge more spontaneously and in communities in which individuals 
understand and appreciate the interconnectedness. One could argue that this is the same type of 
interaction Karl Deutsch envisioned in his theory of transactionalism. To him a “sense of 
community” (i.e. a collective identity) emerges on the basis of political and economic cooperation, 
which in turn gives rise to this kind of intrinsic social interaction between members of the 
community. Following Deutsch two kinds of interaction are expected to stimulate collective 
European identity formation: interaction in a European public sphere and interaction through cross-
border mobility.  
 
Research completed on both these types of interaction confirms the identity activating potential. 
Following Habermasian logic, a European public sphere can be said to increase European identity 
salience by supplying a communicative arena in which shared understandings of commonality and 
distinctiveness emerge. Regarding cross-border mobility empirical studies have shown a significant 
and positive correlation between expat experience and European identification. While these finding 
suggest a clear avenue for collective European identity formation my analysis has indicated that the 
potential has not yet been fulfilled. Not because the correlation has turned out to be weak or 
insignificant, but because a broad European public sphere is missing and because the cross-border 
mobility lacks a distinctively European nature.  
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Regarding the formation of a European public sphere a significant obstacle arises from the lack of a 
lingua franca. Some researches however reject the notion that we need a supranational pan-
European public sphere. Instead they find that an Europeanization of national public spheres - 
which they argue is already in place - is sufficient. However, such studies tend to focus on certain 
(elitist) media outlets disregarding the broader media with a perhaps wider scope. In fact, empirical 
data show dissatisfaction with the quantity of media reporting on Europe as well as a significant 
information deficit at level of ordinary citizens. This can be explained to some extent by reference 
to other studies, which have found that European topics receive little attention when compared to 
local or national topics. To me these findings suggest, that while a public sphere has the potential to 
forge a collective European identity, this is only the case to the extent is has a broad and inclusive 
nature. 
 
While expat experience tends to activate a European social identity the current nature of cross-
border mobility in Europe is unlikely to forge a collective European identity. The reason for this is 
that the mobility patterns are either more local than European or more global than European. It is 
more global than European in the sense that most foreigners living in EU-countries originate from 
outside the EU. Meanwhile, it is more local than European in the sense that the majority of EU-
foreigners living in another member state have emigrated from neighbouring countries. In both 
cases it seems unlikely that such mobility increases the sense of belonging to a particular European 
community. This suggests that to the extent cross-border mobility can spur collective European 
identity formation is must be of a particular European rather than Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon or 
global nature.  
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